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ARTICLES 
CRAFTING NEXT GENERATION ECO-LABEL POLICY 
BY 
JASON J. CZARNEZKI,* K. INGEMAR JÖNSSON** & KATRINA KUH*** 
Eco-labels present a promising policy tool in the effort to achieve 
sustainable consumption. Many questions remain, however, about the 
extent to which eco-labels can contribute to sustainability efforts and 
how to maximize their effectiveness. This Article deploys research 
from evolutionary psychology, behavioral law and economics, and 
norm theory to offer specific insights for the design and 
implementation of eco-labels to enhance their influence on sustainable 
consumer choice. Notably, this research suggests possibilities for eco-
labels to shape or expand consumer preferences for green goods, and 
thereby enhance eco-label influence on consumer behavior by 
extending it beyond eco-minded consumers. We suggest that public 
exposure of the label (so that people see it) and the exposure of the 
purchasing behavior (so that other people can see that you have bought 
the product) are key elements to the success of eco-labels—the social 
context around product purchasing may be as important as the eco-
label itself. We recommend that behavioral insights be used to improve 
eco-labeling as traditionally understood by incorporating knowledge 
 
* Jason J. Czarnezki (A.B., J.D., The University of Chicago) is the Gilbert and Sarah Kerlin 
Distinguished Professor of Environmental Law, and Associate Dean and Executive Director of 
Environmental Law Programs at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. 
** K. Ingemar Jönsson (Ph.D., Lund University) is a Professor in Theoretical and Evolutionary 
Ecology, Department of Environmental Science and Bioscience, at Kristianstad University, 
Sweden. 
*** Katrina Kuh (B.A., J.D., Yale University) is the Haub Distinguished Professor of 
Environmental Law at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. This project 
benefited greatly from comments received during the Environmental Research Workshop at 
Georgetown Law Center. And we are indebted to our hard-working research assistant, Connor 
Herdic. 
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about behavioral tendencies into label design so as to allow for more 
accurate matching of consumers’ preexisting environmental 
preferences to eco-labeled goods, and develop next-generation eco-
labeling policy with the potential to significantly expand the market for 
eco-labeled goods. Specifically, 1) Eco-labels could be purposefully 
designed and implemented to attract consumers motivated by social 
norms; 2) Eco-labels could appeal to a wider range of abstract norm 
alternate more broadly or locally accepted and strong abstract that are 
stronger and/or more broadly accepted or locally-salient; and 3) Eco-
labels could highlight private, near and near-term benefits. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Eco-labeling policy sits at the intersection of three powerful 
developments in environmental law and policy—the effort to craft effective 
policies to address unsustainable consumption, increasing deployment of 
informational regulation as a policy tool, and a new focus on individuals as 
potential targets of environmental regulation. 
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Unsustainable consumption, arising in part from individual 
consumption practices, is generally recognized as a key driver of 
environmental harm and there is widespread consensus about the need to 
develop policy to improve consumption practices. The World Wildlife Fund’s 
2014 Living Planet Report concludes that 1.5 Earths would be required to 
meet human demands each year, that the number of countries whose 
consumption footprint exceeds its own biological productive capacity 
continues to grow, and that the per capita ecological footprint of high-
income countries is about five times more than that of low-income 
countries.1 The importance of consumption practices as a driver of 
environmental harm and the need to develop policy directed at achieving 
sustainable consumption has been recognized globally for decades. 
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development concluded: “[T]he major cause of the continued deterioration 
of the global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and 
production, particularly in industrialized countries, which is a matter of 
grave concern, aggravating poverty and imbalances. . . . Developed countries 
should take the lead in achieving sustainable consumption patterns[.]”2 
The General Assembly reiterated the importance of sustainable 
consumption in 2012, endorsing the outcome document of the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want, 
which recognizes “that urgent action on unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption where they occur remains fundamental in 
addressing environmental sustainability” and that “fundamental changes in 
the way societies consume and produce are indispensable for achieving 
global sustainable development.”3 The General Assembly also accepted the 
recommendation in The Future We Want to adopt a 10-year Framework of 
Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production (10YFP);4 the 
10YFP is presently being implemented under the direction of a ten member 
board consisting of two members from each U.N. regional group with the 
United Nations Environment Programme serving as Secretariat.5 
 
 1  WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, LIVING PLANET REPORT 9–10, 12, 38 (2014). 
 2  U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, ¶¶ 4.3, 4.8(b), U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.151/26 (June 3–14, 1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]; see also Paul Ekins, The Sustainable 
Consumer Society: A Contradiction in Terms?, 3 INT’L ENVTL. AFF. 243, 249 (1991) (“[T]he 
environmental crisis . . . must be laid squarely at the door of northern industrial consumer 
lifestyles and their imitations now in nearly all countries of the Third World.”). 
 3  G.A. Res. 66/288, annex, The Future We Want, ¶¶ 61, 224 (Sept. 11, 2012). Goal 12 of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also aims to ensure sustainable consumption and 
production patterns, stating in Paragraph 28 of the 2030 Agenda: “We [Countries] commit to 
making fundamental changes in the way that our societies produce and consume goods and 
services.” Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ¶ 28, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/70/1 (2015).  
 4  The Future We Want, supra note 3, ¶ 226. 
 5  G.A. Res. 67/203, ¶ 5 (Feb. 27, 2013); see also Econ. & Soc. Council, Progress report on 
the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production patterns, 
¶¶ 2, 7–9, U.N. Doc. E/2015/56 (Mar. 31, 2015) (further discussing the board of the framework 
and implementation). For an overview of the work on the 10-year framework programmes, see 
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However, the clear unsustainability of present levels and patterns of 
consumption, and the stated resolve to develop policy to address the same, 
stands in stark contrast to the halting progress toward that goal.6 As 
evidenced by the World Wildlife Fund’s tracking of consumption and 
ecological footprints, if there has been on-the-ground progress, it has been 
quite limited.7 And a review of the 10YFP suggests that global policy efforts 
are still very much in the stage of development, with many initiatives 
focused on information collection and the implementation of case studies. 
The struggle to develop effective consumption policy can be attributed 
in part to the fact that to do so requires a reorientation of traditional 
environmental law and policy. Environmental law has long focused on 
pollution as opposed to consumption8 and on large, industrial sources as 
opposed to individuals.9 While upstream controls on the manufacturers of 
consumer goods and services, typical of traditional environmental 
regulation, is important, achieving sustainable consumption will also likely 
require interventions targeted more directly at individual consumption.10 The 
aggregated environmental impact of consumption by individuals is clear. 
In the context of climate change, for example, greenhouse gas 
emissions attributable to the direct emissions of individuals or households, 
indexed primarily to emissions generated by private transportation and 
home energy use, are estimated to account for approximately 30% of total 
U.S. emissions, or roughly 8% of worldwide emissions.11 Notably, this 
 
10YFP: Global Action for Sustainable Production and Consumption, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T 
PROGRAMME, https://perma.cc/2K6P-VZJ4 (last visited July 14, 2018). 
 6  Doris A. Fuchs & Sylvia Lorek, Sustainable Consumption Governance: A History of 
Promises and Failures, 28 J. OF CONSUMER POL’Y 261, 282 (2005); Lucia Reisch et al., Sustainable 
Food Consumption: An Overview of Contemporary Issues and Policies, SUSTAINABILITY: SCI., 
PRACTICE & POL’Y, Summer 2013, at 7, 16–17 (observing with respect to food policy and 
sustainability, “On the demand side, national governments generally play a relatively weak role 
in managing the adverse effects of (over)consumption[,]” and “explicit policies for sustainable 
consumption in general and for food consumption in particular are uncommon.”). 
 7  See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 1, at 32–33, 39, 57 (explaining that humanity’s 
ecological footprint and consumption levels are still rising). 
 8  Doug Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change and Consumption, 
[2008] 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,825, 10,825–28 (describing the historical lack of 
attention to consumption from environmental policy, discussing the relationship between law 
and consumer preferences, and explaining why consumption must now be addressed head on 
by environmental policy). 
 9  E.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated 
Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 536–37, 542–43 (2004). 
 10  U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION: A HANDBOOK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 7 (Emily Briggs ed., 2015) (observing that sustainable production and 
consumption “requires policy to not just improve production, but also to support consumers to 
move towards sustainable consumption choices. Therefore everyone in society has a role to 
play in this transition including governments, educators, the private sector and each and every 
consumer.”) (emphasis omitted). Individuals are also an important source of political will to 
generate and sustain political interventions in support of sustainability. 
 11  Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: Designing and 
Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, [2010] 40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,547, 10,549; Anne E. Carlson et al., The Forum: Creating the Carbon-Neutral Citizen, 
ENVTL. F. Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 46, 46; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne Steinemann, The Carbon-
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estimate counts only direct emissions; estimates of greenhouse gas 
emissions attributable to individuals are far greater when indirect emissions 
resulting from the preparation (production and delivery) of a product or 
service before its use (such as the emissions generated during the 
manufacture and delivery of a car) are included. One study that adopted a 
consumer lifestyle approach designed to capture both direct and indirect 
emissions concluded that consumer lifestyle decisions account for 85% of all 
energy use in the United States and that consumer consumption activities 
account for 102% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.12 A European Union 
study showed that groups of products from only three areas—food and 
drink, private transportation, and housing—are together responsible for 70–
80% of the environmental impacts of personal consumption.13 
In addition to requiring a reorientation of traditional approaches to 
environmental regulation, sustainable consumption touches on a number of 
complex and vexing issues. Scholars observe that “sustainable 
consumption’s ultimate objective remains indistinct, blurred by 
disagreement over appropriate measures, issues of international and 
intergenerational equity, and, most important, implications on individual 
lifestyles” and that “issues of sustainable consumption go to the very heart 
of societal norms such as lifestyle, equity, and cultural identity—issues that 
cannot be easily resolved in the legislature or courtroom.”14 Many also 
suggest that achieving sustainability will require reductions in overall levels 
of consumption, at least in the developed world, which is at odds with the 
pro-growth tenets of capitalism.15 Developing consumption policy thus 
presents distinct policy challenges. 
Two developments in environmental regulation may, however, prove 
helpful in the effort to craft consumption policy. First, a growing number of 
scholars recognize the importance of extending the reach of environmental 
law to individuals and are examining how this can occur.16 Additionally, 
environmental policy has embraced informational regulation, or “regulation 
 
Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2007). In defining individual behavior, 
Vandenbergh and Steinemann include emissions from personal motor vehicle use, personal air 
travel, mass transport, and emissions attributable to household electricity use. Id. at 1677, 1690. 
 12  Shui Bin & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Consumer Lifestyle Approach to US Energy Use and the 
Related CO2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 197, 203–05 (2005). 
 13  B.P. WEIDEMA ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT POTENTIALS OF MEAT AND DAIRY 
PRODUCTS 17 (Peter Eder & Luis Delgado eds., 2008). 
 14  James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1255–56 
(1997). 
 15  See Michal Jemma Carrington et al., The Ideology of the Ethical Consumption Gap, 16 
MARKETING THEORY 21, 24 (2016) (arguing the social failure to consume ethically is driven by 
destructive capitalist structures that undermine ethical consumerism). 
 16  See, e.g., JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE & INDIVIDUAL 
BEHAVIOR (2011); Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the 
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2009); 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Individual as Polluter, [2005] 35 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,723; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation 
Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005).  
5_TOJCI.KUH (DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2018  6:25 PM 
414 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 48:409 
through disclosure.”17 “Generation of information about the environmental 
consequences of actions can provide a means of encouraging better 
environmental performance.”18 “[I]nformation helps inform government 
decisions about how and whether to protect the environment[,]” and can 
motivate the avoidance of environmental problems.19 In particular, “[t]he 
provision of environmental information about products, processes that lead 
to the products, and producers of the products (owners of the processes) 
has become an accepted, if by no means fully understood, part of the 
environmental policy toolkit.”20 These “new tools” of environmental policy 
“all have one or both of two features. They use education and the provision 
of information to try to change behavior, and the changes in behavior are 
voluntary in the sense that they are not driven by specific regulatory 
directives, externality taxes, or permit markets.”21 Most importantly, in light 
of the difficulties of applying more traditional interventions such as 
mandates for individuals,22 informational regulation may constitute a more 
feasible policy option for addressing individual consumption.23 
In terms of regulatory policy, a key question at the intersection of these 
related developments—the imperative to address consumption, a focus on 
individuals as potential targets of environmental regulation, and the growing 
use of informational regulation—is whether information production and 
dissemination can lead to consumer-driven environmental improvement.24 
Much work is focused on this question. For example, to support revision of 
 
 17  Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999). See also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 327–44 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the development of 
“regulation through revelation”). 
 18  DAVID M. DREISEN & ROBERT W. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A PRAGMATIC AND 
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 329 (2007). 
 19  Id. (citing Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 115, 121–40 (2004)).  
 20  Clifford S. Russell et al., Environment, Information and Consumer Behaviour: An 
Introduction, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 1 (Signe Krarup & 
Clifford S. Russell eds., 2005). 
 21  Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern, Exploring New Tools for Environmental Protection, in 
NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 5 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2002). 
 22  Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (2001) (identifying the 
difficulties of applying traditional regulation to individuals and observing that “[w]hen 
numerous people must act to solve a collective problem and lack the economic incentive to do 
so, traditional government regulation, such as formal law, may be infeasible, ineffectual, or 
politically difficult. The costs of monitoring and enforcement can be prohibitively expensive or 
may raise privacy concerns.”). 
 23  Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 9, at 608 (“Perhaps the most 
important implication of the new focus on individuals as polluters is the need to look beyond 
the command and control versus economic incentives debate to informational regulation and 
norm management.”). 
 24  For an overview of doubts about the utility of ethical consumption generally, arguing 
that it avoids systemic critique of consumerist capitalism, see Carrington et al., supra note 15, at 
21, 24 (“[E]ven if the currently low percentage of ethical consumers would double or even 
triple . . . the effect would be negligible. . . . [I]n the context of the natural environment, many 
observers have argued that in order to halt the ecological catastrophe we need not only 
responsible consumption but significantly reduced consumption[.]” (citations omitted)). 
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the Sustainable Consumption and Production Industrial Policy (SCP/SIP) 
Action Plan, the European Commission launched a research study, Policies 
to Encourage Sustainable Consumption, that undertook an in-depth review 
of issues related to sustainable consumption and behavior, including a 
review of the main policy tools for promoting consumer behavior change 
(behavioral, informational/communication, economic, and regulatory).25 
Notably, the study identifies the existence of “good practice” with respect to 
the design of environmental labels but observes that “[t]here is much to be 
learned from marketing experts on how to effectively communicate 
information aimed at influencing consumers’ decisions”26 and concedes that 
while “[a] number of EU policies to date have been based on the premise 
that providing consumers with information is sufficient to bring about 
change, . . . there are indications that the approach of ‘providing consumers 
with information’ in order to make decisions is not sufficient to bring about 
changes in consumption behavior.”27 The study recognizes and investigates 
the use of behavioral approaches to more effectively influence consumer 
behavior but ultimately cautions that policymakers should “not consider the 
possibility of using the behavioural approach and ‘nudges’ until the 
consumer decision-making process has been well understood.”28 
The 10YFP being implemented pursuant to the The Future We Want 
includes a program focused on consumer information and, as with the 
European Union research study discussed above, articulates the need for 
additional research to support consumer behavior interventions. The 
implementation pathway adopted in 2014 for the 10YFP Consumer 
Information Programme sets out as one “sub-work area” to “[i]dentify and 
scale up effective practices of consumer information” and as another 
“[m]oving from information to action: [u]nderstanding the impact of 
sustainability information on consumer behavior.”29 These work areas are 
focused on understanding how to communicate sustainability information to 
individual consumers in ways that cause them to adopt sustainable 
consumption practices. The implementation pathway cites to recognized 
challenges and these include that “[c]ommunication of information is not 
always effective” and that “[h]igh-quality consumer information does not 
necessarily lead to a change in consumption practices.”30 Action items 
specified in the implementation pathway include “[s]tocktaking of existing 
research on consumer behaviour related to sustainability information” and 
“[a]pplied field research []testing drivers to behavioural change and effective 
communications practices . . . .”31 
 
 25  See JONATHAN BAIN ET AL., POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION: EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION TECHNICAL REPORT 2012-061, at 7, 13–14 (Aug. 22, 2012), https://perma.cc/5RCJ-374Y 
[hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION TECHNICAL REPORT]. 
 26  Id. at 13. 
 27  Id. at 35. 
 28  Id. at 9. 
 29  U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, 10YFP CONSUMER INFORMATION PROGRAMME: IMPLEMENTATION 
PATHWAY (2015), https://perma.cc/3XGA-FUM3. 
 30  Id.  
 31  Id. 
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The above-described developments illustrate the importance of and 
potential for crafting policies to maximize the use of eco-labels to encourage 
pro-environmental consumer choice; the conclusions and objectives of the 
European Union research study, Policies to Encourage Sustainable 
Consumption, and the Consumer Information Programme Implementation 
Pathway, however, make clear that important knowledge gaps must be filled 
to do so effectively. At present, eco-labels are ubiquitous (by one count, in 
2009 roughly 600 labels were used worldwide to characterize products as 
environmentally-friendly in some manner) but not well understood.32 The 
United States alone has at least 19 eco-labels and environmental 
certifications in the food context.33 The proliferation of labeling programs 
and guidelines has preceded and outpaced research about eco-label program 
design and implementation. While there is great research interest in and an 
emerging body of research addressed to the use of eco-labels, significant 
questions remain about core considerations, such as the best process for 
creating an eco-label, what types of eco-labels are effective in changing 
consumer behavior, and how they should be designed and implemented. 
This Article seeks to advance understanding of how the design and 
implementation of eco-labels, incorporating both communication and 
behavioral approaches, can influence consumer decisions. Part II describes 
current approaches to eco-labeling and identifies the limitations of existing 
eco-label policy, including, most importantly, the fact that labels have 
produced uneven results to prompt significant numbers of consumers to 
consistently choose sustainably produced products. Part III then reviews 
bodies of research with the potential to yield insight into label design and 
implementation, including work in the fields of evolutionary psychology, 
behavioral law and economics, and norm theory. While research into label 
design already incorporates insights from some of these fields (or the 
underlying psychological research that they draw from), evolutionary 
psychology has not been the subject of prior extensive study in the context 
of eco-labels nor has there previously been an effort to compare and 
synthesize insights across these fields. Part IV summarizes, reconciles, and 
distills insights from these research streams into specific recommendations 
for eco-label design and implementation. Specifically, Part IV recommends 
that behavioral insights can be used to 1) improve eco-labeling as 
traditionally understood by incorporating knowledge about behavioral 
tendencies into label design to as to allow for more accurate matching of 
consumers’ preexisting environmental preferences to eco-labeled goods, and 
2) develop next-generation eco-labeling policy with the potential to 
significantly expand the market for eco-labeled goods by invoking social 
norms, broadening the normative bases to which eco-goods appeal, and 
emphasizing private, near and near-term benefits of eco-goods. Part V 
 
 32  Jason J. Czarnezki et al., Creating Order Amidst Food Eco-Label Chaos, 25 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 281, 281 (2015). 
 33  DAN VERMEER ET AL., AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
CERTIFICATIONS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 30 (Jay S. Golden ed., 2010), 
https://perma.cc/P2HY-VGBY. 
5_TOJCI.KUH (DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2018  6:25 PM 
2018] ECO-LABEL POLICY 417 
concludes by discussing the broader implications of these recommendations 
for eco-label policy and identifying areas where policy development would 
benefit from further research. 
II. ECO-LABELING POLICY 
Given the potential policy advantages of information regulation and 
dissemination, consumer interest, and perceived economics gains for 
producers and retailers for making and selling a value-added product, eco-
labeling on consumable and durable goods has proliferated worldwide. 
Proponents of eco-labeling argue that they can help foster environmentally 
friendly consumer behavior and, in the aggregate, influence and reduce 
environmental harm.34 An eco-label informational and certification scheme 
can provide engaged consumers with a measurable analysis created by 
experts and also provide a single point of product comparison for the less-
engaged consumer. 
Significant questions remain, however, about eco-label design and 
efficacy.35 There are, for example, concerns about consumer confusion and 
best practices. How entities define adjectives on eco-labels varies greatly, 
and the accuracy of these claims may be questionable. The increase in 
unverifiable and non-third-party certified eco-labels, in particular, can create 
confusion among consumers and can undermine the value of well-
intentioned labeling schemes that seek to highlight environmentally friendly 
options.36 As a form of information regulation, eco-labels contain many 
different types of information that come from many different sources. In 
terms of a taxonomy of eco-labels, labels have content—the type of 
information that the label contains—and require validation by an entity that 
determines what information is conveyed and assesses its validity.37 It is 
further unclear the extent to which eco-labeling can be expected to support 
widespread sustainable consumption. As discussed infra, to date eco-labeled 
goods have largely failed to garner significant market share, although some 
sectors show growth.38 Expansion of eco-label market share may occur 
through refinement and improvement within existing eco-labeling 
 
 34  See Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, 
and Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 4 (2015) (suggesting that 
“consumer informational labeling can be an effective regulatory tool in encouraging eco-friendly 
choices”).  
 35  See Jason J. Czarnezki et al., Eco-labelling, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4) (on file with authors) (noting that, 
despite the popularity of eco-labels, successful eco-labels face a number of implementation 
barriers and normative concerns such as the cost and technical challenges to generate accurate, 
verifiable, and understandable information; inequality as many lack access to or cannot afford 
high-priced eco-labeled products; and the voluntary purchasing context of the individual 
consumer does not require any actual changes to primary behavior).  
 36  See id. at 20–21 (“The increase in unverifiable and non-third-party certified eco-labels can 
create confusion and skepticism among consumers, who may not trust the word of private 
profit-seeking corporations.”). 
 37  Id. at 5. 
 38  See infra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.  
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paradigms, perhaps coupled with increases in societal awareness and eco-
minded consumers. There are, however, reasons to believe that it may also 
be helpful or necessary to orient eco-labels to a broader consumer segment 
to drive meaningful changes in consumption patterns. 
A. Eco-label Content 
Eco-label content can be sorted into two sets of categories. First, the 
label conveys environmental information that is positive—a claim that the 
product is environmentally friendly in some way—negative—a warning that 
the product is risky to human health or the environment—or neutral—
information that may only be meaningful relative to a scale. Warning labels 
often also include instructions for safe use. Second, the label conveys 
information either about the product itself or about the process by which the 
product was made. 
Neutral labels offer information that is not in itself positive or negative. 
For instance, “environmental product declarations” (EPD) are “industry-
created statements containing a variety of information about the 
composition and environmental characteristics of a product based on life-
cycle assessment . . . .”39 This approach would inform consumers about a 
wide range of life-cycle environmental concerns associated with the product 
such as water usage, chemicals used, pollution and carbon emissions, and 
waste disposal. Unlike an eco-label seal, an EPD alone would disclose 
information “in a neutral way that enables evaluations by purchasers but 
that does not seek to judge the environmental characteristics of a product.”40 
Positive claims attempt to induce consumers to choose eco-friendly 
items over a substantially similar, but not as eco-friendly, item. As eco-
friendly products are often more expensive to produce, labels are a 
mechanism for sellers to increase the price and capture the consumer’s 
willingness to pay more for the actual or perceived benefits associated with 
the environmental claim.41 Positive claims might relate directly to consumer 
health or might communicate an environmental characteristic of the 
product. 
The process/product distinction is also key to understanding eco-label 
content. “Process claims convey information about the conditions of 
manufacture, including, but not limited to, chemical and fossil fuel inputs, 
ingredient sourcing practices, water and energy use during processing, 
distribution methods, and environmental by-products of processing.”42 A 
process claim does not, however, convey any information about the product 
 
 39  Nancy J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings: A 
Comparative Law Approach Featuring the United States and the European Union, 23 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 397, 436 n.232 (2005) (citing EUR. COMM’N, SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE 2ND INTEGRATED 
PRODUCT POLICY EXPERT WORKSHOP: ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT DECLARATIONS (ISO 14025 
TECHNICAL REPORT) 2 (2001), https://perma.cc/RR23-H2RB). 
 40  Id. 
 41  Czarnezki et al., supra note 35, at 6; see also VERMEER ET AL., supra note 33, at 11. 
 42  Czarnezki et al., supra note 35, at 7. 
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itself, which may be functionally and chemically identical to a product 
produced under different circumstances. 
B. Eco-label Sources 
A major form of voluntary, private-sponsored labeling consists of “self-
declared” or “first-party” claims, some of which state a single attribute like 
“sustainable,” or more recently, make an environmental claim based on a 
number of self-created standards. “A self-declaration environmental claim is 
one that is made without independent third-party certification by 
manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, or anyone else likely to 
benefit from such a claim.”43 Surveys demonstrate that the proliferation of 
manufacturer-sponsored eco-labeling schemes “has caused widespread 
consumer confusion and skepticism over the alleged environmental 
claims[,]” leading many manufacturers and retailers to turn to independent, 
third-party expert entities to certify that environmental product claims are 
valid.44 
First-party labels are governed only by the producing company, while 
some label schemes rely on private third-party certification.45 Third-party 
labels mitigate transparency and accuracy concerns by imposing uniform 
publicly available standards, yet accountability concerns remain.46 While 
third-party certifications have grown dramatically in recent years, both first-
party and third-party schemes are entirely voluntary.47 Some labels are 
publicly governed, helping to abate accountability concerns through publicly 
mandated information disclosures, and making voluntary labels subject to 
government oversight of label standards or a public verification process.48 
 
 43  Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 
21, 136 n.449 (2001). See also Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling Programs and the 
GATT/WTO Regime, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 608 (1999) (“The other subcategory of the 
voluntary, private-sponsored labeling schemes is based on self-declaration claims, or first-party 
claims. A self-declaration environmental claim is an environmental claim that is made, without 
independent third-party certification, by manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, or 
anyone else likely to benefit from such a claim. Such a declaration can take such forms as 
statement symbols, package labels and advertising.” (footnote omitted)). 
 44  Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental 
Labeling and Its Role in the “Greening” of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 216–17 
(1996) (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS 
WORLDWIDE 6–7 (1993)); Avi Gesser, Canada’s Environmental Choice Program: A Model for a 
“Trade-Friendly” Eco-Labeling Scheme, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 501, 511–12 (1998) (“Understandably, 
consumers are skeptical about the truthfulness of environmental claims made by the 
manufacturers themselves. As a result, unregulated first-party environmental labeling programs 
provide little assistance for many environmentally conscious consumers. This is not only 
because producers may make misleading claims about the environmental friendliness of their 
products, but also because they may lack the resources and expertise to properly evaluate their 
goods.”).  
 45  Czarnezki et al., supra note 35, at 9–10; see also Staffin, supra note 44, at 220, 230. 
 46  Czarnezki et al., supra note 35, at 10. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id.; see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS 
WORLDWIDE 2–18 (1993). 
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Private voluntary label schemes can either be self-declared or third-party 
certified. 
There is no shortage of eco-labeling regimes in terms of third-party 
certifiers and government sponsored labels. Organic labeling programs for 
food exist, carbon labeling programs and environmental best practices for 
all products are under development, and environmental life-cycle 
assessment and costing labels are under consideration. Taking food as an 
example, the third-party certifier KRAV in particular has long been the key 
player in the Swedish organic market49 and has created a best practices 
approach in different food sectors50 to receive its label, adding climate 
standards into their existing organic label.51 The label does not provide 
quantifiable emissions numbers, but ensures that measures have been taken 
to reduce climate impact. KRAV labeling takes organic and climate factors 
into account, but also standards for animal welfare, social responsibility, and 
public health.52 
Both the United States and European Union have developed organic 
food certification and labeling programs. And the nature of food labeling has 
shifted from private marketing and sales efforts to also include public and 
environmental health. Nutritional labeling began in the United States in 1990 
under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act.53 The U.S. Organic Foods 
Production Act (OFPA)54 establishes a national organic certification program 
in which agricultural products may be labeled as organic if produced and 
handled without the use of synthetic substances. Under the OFPA and the 
National Organic Program (NOP), the U.S. government creates production, 
handling, and labeling standards for organic agricultural products.55 
But what does “organic” mean? What counts as organic? For many, the 
organic label means healthy, environmentally friendly, safe, and pesticide-
free. While in some cases these characteristics are true, they are not 
elements of the legal definitions of organic—and legal definitions matter. 
The NOP created under OFPA creates a four-tiered labeling system for 
organic foods.56 All organics are not created equally. The label does not 
signify that that food is healthier for the consumer. 
First, a product can be labeled “100 percent organic” and carry the 
United States Department of Agriculture and certifying agent seals if it 
contains 100% organically produced ingredients as defined by OFPA (e.g., 
 
 49  See generally KRAV, Market Report 2016 (2016), https://perma.cc/3FHX-CRW5. 
 50  This is a decision to use verifiable production process standards, or standards based on 
quantitative data/statistics about environment costs.  
 51  “KRAV has noted this in its slogan accompanying its label. The label is a green ‘KRAV’ 
surrounded by an oval with the slogan, ‘Du får mer,’ meaning ‘you get more.’” MARY JANE 
ANGELO ET AL., FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 314 & n.123 (2013). 
 52  Id. at 314. 
 53  Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 102–535, 104 Stat. 2353 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 54  Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2012). 
 55  See, e.g., id. § 6517 (laying out production standards). 
 56  7 C.F.R. § 205.301 (2014). In addition to looking for “organic” labeled foods, consumers 
can look at five-digit PLU codes. Organic foods all start with 9. 
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without synthetic substances).57 Second, a product must contain at least 95% 
organic ingredients to be labeled simply “organic” and use the USDA and 
private certifying agent seals.58 Third, a product with at least 70% organically 
produced ingredients (or perhaps better stated, with only 70% organic 
ingredients) can be labeled “made with organic ingredients” and carry the 
seal of a private certifying agent.59 For products containing less than 70% 
organic ingredients, organic ingredients may be listed on the label, but 
neither the word “organic” nor any seal can be used.60 Thus, consumers of 
organic products should look for the USDA seal over the sole seal of other 
certifying agents, including state governments, because it guarantees at least 
95% organic content. 
In addition to the existence of government labels in some markets, 
“best practices” guidance does exist for eco-labels, to help avoid consumer 
confusion. For example, the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
published the Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims 
(“Green Guides”)61 to enlighten marketers and explain how FTC will enforce 
federal law in the context of environmental marketing and advertising.62 
These guidelines “seek to provide marketers with a ‘safe harbor’ concerning 
certain ‘green’ claims . . . so that they will know when a claim is potentially 
deceptive or misleading.”63 The Green Guides reflect the FTC’s five general 
requirements for all advertising claims: 1) claims must be substantiated; 2) 
claims may not be overbroad and unqualified; 3) comparative claims must 
state the basis for comparison; 4) claims “should not exaggerate or overstate 
attributes or benefits[;]” and 5) claims should not use “symbols or seals of 
approval whose significance the public doesn’t understand[.]”64 
Similarly, the International Organization for Standards (ISO), a private 
entity that develops voluntary standards through industry consensus, has 
developed guidelines for eco-labels.65 As a consequence, according to ISO 
standards, eco-labels must be “accurate, verifiable, relevant, and not 
 
 57  7 C.F.R. §§ 205.301(a), 205.303 (2014). OFPA defines “synthetic” as “a substance that is 
formulated or manufactured by a chemical process or by a process that chemically changes a 
substance extracted from naturally occurring plant, animal, or mineral sources, except that 
such term shall not apply to substances created by natural occurring biological processes.” 7 
U.S.C. § 6502(21); 7 C.F.R. § 205.2. 
 58  7 C.F.R. §§ 205.301(b), 205.303. 
 59  Id. § 205.301(c).  
 60  Id. § 205.301(d). 
 61  16 C.F.R. §§ 260.1–260.17 (2014). 
 62  Kimberly C. Cavanagh, Comment, It’s a Lorax Kind of Market! But Is It a Sneetches Kind 
of Solution?: A Critical Review of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental Marketing Regulation, 9 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 133, 155–56 (1998). 
 63  Staffin, supra note 44, at 215 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 260.3 (1995)). See also Cavanagh, supra 
note 62, at 155–56. 
 64  J. THOMAS ROSCH, RESPONSIBLE GREEN MARKETING, FED. TRADE COMM’N REPORT 6–8 (June 
18, 2008), https://perma.cc/Y4ZC-TGQ5. 
 65  Int’l Org. for Standardization, Reference No. ISO 14021, Environmental Labels and 
Declarations - Self-Declared Environmental Claims (Type II Environmental Labelling) § 1 
(1999); See also David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private 
Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 81, 89 (2009). 
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misleading” and “based on scientific methodology that is sufficiently 
thorough and comprehensive to support the claim . . . .”66 
Eco-labels require a good quality assurance scheme, which would 
benefit from governmental ownership of the label, and a successful 
marketing program.67 Centralized government eco-labels are more effective 
than numerous private ones, unless the private labels are well known with 
long-standing tradition and space in the market, and simple, clear, obvious, 
and transparent seal-of-approval logos and labels have generally shaped 
consumer behavior more than the complex information-disclosure labels. 
C. Eco-label Efficacy 
Perhaps the biggest challenge for eco-labels is in determining how to 
best convey information to consumers in a manner that will effectively shift 
buying behavior. While sales of green products continue to grow in some 
sectors (in particular the organic food sector, which has shown rapid 
growth),68 eco-labeled goods overall struggle to capture significant market 
share.69 In the United States, for example, hybrid car sales constituted 
roughly 2% of total auto sales in 2016;70 green products account for only 3% 
of household cleaner and laundry products.71 And “[a]lthough the organic 
 
 66  Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO 14020, Environmental Labels and Declarations – 
General Principles §§ 4.2.1, 4.4.1 (1998). 
 67  See Helen Nilsson et al., The Use of Eco-Labeling Like Initiatives on Food Products to 
Promote Quality Assurance—Is There Enough Credibility?, 12 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 517, 522, 
524 (2004) (arguing that third-party quality assurance enhances label trustworthiness and that 
proper marketing is vital). 
 68  For an overview of ethical spending in the UK, see TRIODOS BANK, ETHICAL CONSUMER 
MARKETS REPORT 2015 (2015), https://perma.cc/2DNC-7MYT (last visited July 14, 2018). 
 69  Numerous scholars have noted the low market share of green products. E.g., Aindrila 
Biswas, A Consumption Value-Gap Analysis for Sustainable Consumption, 24 ENVTL. SCI. 
POLLUTION RESOURCES 7714, 7714 (2017) (“Despite the emphasis of various stakeholders 
towards environmental aftermath, the market share of green products has not shown equivalent 
augmentation.” (citations omitted)); Iris Vermeir & Wim Verbeke, Sustainable Food 
Consumption: Exploring the Consumer “Attitude-Behavioral Intention” Gap, 19 J. OF AGRIC. & 
ENVTL. ETHICS 169, 170 (2006) (“Practice, however, shows that initiatives like sustainable 
organic food, products free from child labor, legally logged wood, and fair-trade products often 
have market shares of less than 1%.” (citation omitted)); Emma Rex & Henrikke Baumann, 
Beyond Ecolabels: What Green Marketing Can Learn from Conventional Marketing, 15 J. 
CLEANER PRODUCTION 567, 567 (2006) (“Except for a handful of product groups, the overall 
market share of ecolabelled products is low. . . . Although a great deal of effort has been put 
into making ecolabelling schemes more effective and efficient, actual sales of ecolabelled 
products have remained at moderate levels.”); Jung-Ah Hwang et al., Why Do Consumers 
Respond to Eco-labels? The Case of Korea, SPRINGERPLUS (2016), at 1, https://perma.cc/R8JQ-
WVZV (“The impact of eco-labels has been much lower than expected, and little increase has 
been seen in the market share of eco-labeled products.”). 
 70  Leslie Josephs, Long Before the Combustion Engine, the Hybrid Car is Facing 
Obsolescence, QUARTZ (July 14, 2017) https://perma.cc/8REJ-LESQ.  
 71  Caitlin Stewart, 3 Reasons Sales of Green Household Products Are Dropping, 
MARKETRESEARCH.COM (March 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/CL4F-JKYB (“The green market still 
remains a niche, accounting for only 3 percent of the total household cleaner and laundry 
product market. . . . Hard-core green consumers have continued to purchase eco-friendly 
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food market has grown continuously over the past decade, the total share of 
organic food is still small compared with the total food market[;]”72 even 
optimistic projections still show organic market share climbing to at most 
10% in most select markets.73 That said, certain labels and criteria have 
developed a significant market share or widespread importance such as 
dolphin-safe tuna and the recyclable logo. And the overall organic market 
share of all food products is nearing 10% in Sweden, and reached the record 
level of over 13% in Denmark in 2017.74 
While this level of market share is not insignificant, representing 
millions of consumers, it would be hard to point to 10% market share as 
success at “achieving sustainable consumption patterns.”75 To understand 
the potential contribution of eco-labeling as a policy tool, it will be important 
to first understand the reasons for this limited market share and whether 
(and how) we can reasonably expect eco-labeling to generate broader shifts 
in consumption behavior. 
III. RESEARCH STREAMS WITH THE POTENTIAL TO INFORM DEVELOPMENT AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCCESSFUL ECO-LABELS 
The basic mechanics for structuring a sustainability-focused eco-
labeling scheme would look like this:76 First, a group of experts can pick 
market categories to target, identified in part by the scope of their adverse 
environmental impacts, where eco-labels could make a significant 
 
household products, helping to keep the market afloat, but these consumers only represent a 
relatively small part of the U.S. population.”). 
 72  H. Stolz et al., Consumer Attitudes Towards Organic Versus Conventional Food with 
Specific Quality Attributes, 58 NJAS-WAGENINGEN J. OF LIFE SCI. 67, 67 (2011) (footnote 
omitted). 
 73  Market share of organic foods in the United States and in several European countries is 
predicted at 7–10% in 2017. See Organic Monitor: Predictions for Sustainable Foods in 2017, 
ORGANIC-MARKET.INFO (Dec. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/3W79-5YYF; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., RELEASE NO. 084-16, USDA REPORTS RECORD GROWTH IN U.S. ORGANIC PRODUCERS, $1 
BILLION IN USDA INVESTMENTS BOOST GROWING MARKETS FOR ORGANIC PRODUCTS AND LOCAL 
FOODS (Apr. 4, 2016) (reporting a significant increase in the number of certified organic 
operations); David Pierson, Organic Products Grew to $35.1 Billion in Sales, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 
2014), https://perma.cc/8BPW-TUGK (reporting on a market study prepared by the Organic 
Trade Association). In Sweden, the sales of ecological food products increased by 18% from 
2015 to 2016, and by 9.8% from 2016 to 2017, reaching 9.3% of the total sales. EKOWEB, 
EKOLOGISK LIVSMEDELSMARKNAD: RAPPORT OM DEN EKOLOGISKA BRANSCHEN SAMMANSTÄLLD AV 
EKOWEB.NU 5 (Jan. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/B2QP-VMHC. The only country that has passed 
the 10% level of organic food market share is Denmark, which reached the record level of 13.3% 
in 2017. Press Release, Organic Den., Danes Are Second to None When It Comes to Buying 
Organics (May 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/2TDH-DXQC. 
 74  EKOWEB, supra note 73, at 5; Press Release, Organic Den., supra note 73. 
 75  Agenda 21, supra note 2, ¶¶ 4.1, 4.8–4.9. 
 76  See CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 16, at 79–80. For a discussion 
of a similar potential eco-label model, see also JULIAN MORRIS, GREEN GOODS?: CONSUMERS, 
PRODUCT LABELS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 30–34 (1997). 
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improvement to the environment.77 Second, objective scientific criteria to 
evaluate products could include a full life-cycle analysis.78 A life-cycle 
analysis would include consideration of natural resource and chemical use 
(starting at the production process or raw extraction stage), as well as 
emissions and pollution generated during the production, distribution and 
use, and disposal stages. The key is to inventory the materials that make up 
the product and allow for product production, and the resulting 
environmental impact, something that is more difficult to determine. Third, 
products could be evaluated according to that scientific criteria and a seal 
awarded.79 Fourth, in light of technology and innovation, production 
selection criteria would be consistently reviewed.80 
A more challenging, but key task is to determine what factors influence 
the success of any eco-labeling program. It is important to target product 
categories whose regulation would help the environment if their carbon, 
chemical, and waste footprints were reduced. It is also, however, important 
to target product categories and consumption contexts where eco-labels are 
likely to influence consumer behavior and to design labels that promote eco-
consumption. 
Even if the producer scheme of an eco-labeled product fulfills all 
desired criteria, consumers may not necessarily choose to purchase the 
product. This is evident from the low market share of most eco-labeled 
products discussed supra.81 Scholars have documented an “attitude-behavior 
gap” in eco-consumption. Consumers often appear to be favorably inclined 
toward the environment and express an intent to so conform their 
consumption (roughly 30% by many accounts), yet purchasing behavior 
often fails to reflect this attitude and intention.82 This may be because these 
eco-minded consumers hold other values (relating, for example, to product 
quality, convenience, or price) or are subject to other influences (habit, 
perceived availability of eco-goods) that outweigh or displace environmental 
 
 77  MORRIS, supra note 76, at 31. Outside the food context, Europe has led in the creation of 
eco-labels with the Nordic Council Program (of Norway, Sweden, and Finland), Germany’s Blue 
Angel Program, and the European Union’s Eco-Label Award Scheme. In Germany’s Blue Angel 
Program, an environmental label jury composed of representatives from environmental groups, 
science organizations, consumer associations, industry, trade unions, and the media, review 
life-cycle reports to determine whether the “Unweltzeichen” (“environmental label”) is 
appropriate. Surya P. Subedi, Balancing International Trade with Environmental Protection: 
International Legal Aspects of Eco-Labels, 25 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 373, 377–78 (1999). The 
European Union uses five administrative layers to implement its eco-label scheme, developing 
product groups and ecological criteria to harmonize environmental labeling in its member 
countries. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 58–59. The eco-label can be affixed to those products that 
meet established product group criteria for the entire life-cycle of the product. 
 78  MORRIS, supra note 76, at 31. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
 82  Vermeir & Verbeke, supra note 69, at 173 (exploring “the gap between the positive 
attitude of consumers and their actual purchase behavior”); Iain A. Davies et al., Do Consumers 
Care About Ethical-Luxury?, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 37, 38 (2012) (“The attitude-behavior gap is a 
well-documented phenomenon which explores why the 30% of consumers that are perceived to 
be ethically orientated, do not translate this into ethical purchasing behaviour.”). 
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values.83 It is also possible, however, that pathologies in eco-label design (for 
example, the type of environmental information provided or the manner in 
which it is presented) dissuade eco-minded consumers from purchasing eco-
labeled products. Both visual and verbal communication of an eco-label may 
affect the purchasing decision, and the effects may also be additive.84 Eco-
labels may also interact with the signal of brands that it co-occurs with, as 
shown in a French study on consumer choice of smoked salmon.85 The 
perceived product quality was improved by an organic label only when 
combined with a brand of low equity, but not with a high equity brand. One 
approach to increasing consumer purchase of eco-labeled goods is thus to 
increase the translation of pro-environmental attitudes into pro-
environmental purchases by reducing barriers (such as inconvenience) and 
improving label design. 
Consumers may also not choose an eco-labeled product because they 
don’t support or value adequately the ecological benefit associated. Here, 
there is no gap between attitude and behavior; the consumer simply isn’t 
interested (or interested enough) in participating in environmental 
protection. 
[I]t is unlikely that a consumer pays attention to an environmental label unless 
he or she values protecting the environment, perceives buying (more) 
environmentally friendly products as an effective means to achieve this goal . . . 
and perceives the information that the label conveys as useful for this 
purpose.86 
However, people may not necessarily buy eco-labeled products for the sake 
of the environment, but rather do it to signal cooperativeness, altruism, or 
high status. This suggests that the effectiveness of an eco-label is determined 
by a combination of its own signaling message and the messages of the 
context in which it occurs. Eco-labeling belongs to the category of branding. 
The success of a brand may often be connected to some quality aspect, but 
in many cases brands may be more related to social, political, subcultural, 
and personal preferences.87 It might, therefore, be possible to increase the 
success of eco-labels by structuring their design and implementation 
 
 83  See Vermeir & Verbeke, supra note 69, at 172–73 (discussing values and habit as causes); 
see also Biswas, supra note 69, at 7715 (describing the “theory of consumption values, which 
propounds that consumers make informed purchase decisions after considering multiple value 
dimensions such as quality, price, environmental impact, emotions, and their trade-offs”). 
 84  Esther Tang et al., Visual and Verbal Communication in the Design of Eco-label for Green 
Consumer Products, 16 J. INT’L CONSUMER MARKETING, no. 4, 2004, at 85, 96. 
 85  Fabrice Larceneux et al., Why Might Organic Labels Fail to Influence Consumer Choices? 
Marginal Labelling and Brand Equity Effects, 35 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 85, 91, 97 (2012). 
 86  John Thøgersen, Psychological Determinants of Paying Attention to Eco-Labels in 
Purchase Decisions: Model Development and Multinational Validation, 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 
285, 290 (2000) (citations omitted). 
 87  Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Evolutionary Branding, 27 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 568, 569 
(2010); cf. David A. Aaker & Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions, J. 
MARKETING, Jan. 1990, at 27, 38–39 (documenting the complexity of brand associations). 
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(including consideration of consumption context) to capture consumers 
motivated by a variety of non-environmental considerations. 
Part III mines different research streams—evolutionary psychology, 
behavioral law and economics, and norm theory—for insights relevant to the 
design and implementation of eco-label regimes to promote environmental 
purchasing behavior. In many cases, the lessons gleaned from these different 
research areas converge, offering support for the same conclusion from 
different perspectives. This convergence should serve to increase 
confidence in the utility of the insight. In Part IV, we summarize and 
reconcile the lessons for eco-label design and implementation gleaned from 
these bodies of research and provide specific recommendations for eco-label 
design and implementation. 
A. Putting Eco-labeling in an Evolutionary Psychology Perspective 
The logic behind eco-labels is that consumers who are concerned about 
the environment should be able to distinguish products with less 
environmental impact from those with higher impact and buy the former 
ones. Thus, it is assumed that if people are concerned about the 
environment, this should also be expressed in their consumption behavior. 
However, as noted above, even if people are well informed about the 
different environmental impact of products they may still choose to buy the 
less environmentally friendly ones, and this gap between knowledge and 
behavior has been well documented.88 
The reason for this cognitive-behavioral gap is still unclear, but Gifford 
made an attempt to categorize what he considered to be “psychological 
barriers” to pro-environmental behavior (in the context of climate change).89 
One of these identified barriers was the “ancient brain,” which referred to 
the fact that the human brain evolved under completely different 
environmental and social conditions than today, where individual concern 
about the environment (and particularly global issues) was not a favored 
trait. Such an evolutionary approach for understanding consumer behavior 
has been presented and discussed in several previous studies based on the 
field of evolutionary psychology.90 The main message is that human 
consumption behavior cannot be understood without considering the 
 
 88  Anja Kollmuss & Julian Agyeman, Mind the Gap: Why Do People Act Environmentally 
and What Are the Barriers to Pro-environmental Behavior?, 8 ENVTL. EDUC. RES. 239, 241 (2002); 
Shis-Ping Lin, The Gap Between Global Issues and Personal Behaviors: Pro-environmental 
Behaviors of Citizens Toward Climate Change in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 18 MITIGATION & 
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 773, 774 (2013). 
 89  Robert Gifford, The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers That Limit Climate 
Change Mitigation and Adaptation, 66 AM. PSYCHOL. 290, 290 (2011). 
 90  See GAD SAAD, THE EVOLUTIONARY BASES OF CONSUMPTION xvii (2007); GAD SAAD, THE 
CONSUMING INSTINCT: WHAT JUICY BURGERS, FERRARIS, PORNOGRAPHY, AND GIFT GIVING REVEAL 
ABOUT HUMAN NATURE 12 (2011); Vladas Griskevicius et al., Going Green to Be Seen: Status, 
Reputation, and Conspicuous Conservation, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 392, 394, 400 
(2010); Vladas Griskevicius & Douglas T. Kenrick, Fundamental Motives: How Evolutionary 
Needs Influence Consumer Behavior, 23 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 372, 372 (2013). 
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evolutionary history and adaptations of the human mind. The basis of 
evolutionary psychology is that the human mind consists of evolved 
cognitive and behavioral mechanisms that promoted individual survival and 
reproductive success in pre-historic generations, mainly during Pleistocene.91 
According to evolutionary psychology, we still largely rely on this pre-
historic brain and its inherent psychological mechanisms in an environment 
that is dramatically different from that of the hunter-gatherer populations of 
our ancestors, in which the brain evolved. This makes our brains ill-equipped 
to respond to the need for sustainable behavior. 
Griskevicius et al. proposed five evolutionary derived tendencies of the 
human mind with importance for pro-environmental behavior: “(1) 
propensity for genetic self-interest, (2) motivation for relative rather than 
absolute status, (3) proclivity to unconsciously copy others, (4) 
predisposition to be shortsighted, and (5) proneness to disregard impalpable 
concerns.”92 
Genetic self-interest is a fundamental principle in the theory of 
evolution by natural selection. Individuals with traits promoting their own 
survival and reproduction, and that of their kin, were the ones that persisted 
and increased in frequency over time, while those with a propensity to give 
up their own reproductive success in favor of other individuals lost ground 
in the competition for representation in later generations.93 For this reason, 
individual sacrifices in favor of benefits for a group or a global community 
cannot be generally expected unless there are close genetic relationships 
between the individual and the group, or strong dependencies and 
expectations of reciprocal behavior (“reciprocal altruism”).94 Since pro-
environmental behavior in many cases is perceived as subordinating 
individual interests to the interests of a larger community, this aspect of the 
human mind is clearly problematic. On the other hand, if policies for pro-
environmental behavior, including eco-labeling, can be framed as favoring 
self-interest in terms of, e.g., benefits for kin or health, it may be more 
effective. 
The role of status has a close connection with genetic self-interest, in 
that high status in a group signals individual quality, competitiveness, and 
access to resources, which are important determinants for attractivity and 
mating opportunities. Griskevicius et al. argue that status must be 
considered in relation to other individuals, resulting in a continuous struggle 
 
 91  See Leda Cosmides et al., Introduction: Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual 
Integration, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 
5–9 (Jerome H. Barkow et al., eds., Oxford University Press 1992). 
 92  Vladas Griskevicius et al., The Evolutionary Bases for Sustainable Behavior: Implications 
for Marketing, Policy, and Social Entrepreneurship, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 115, 115–16 
(2012). For a slightly different categorization, see Griskevicious & Kenrick, supra note 90, at 
372–74. 
 93  Cf. Griskevicius et al., The Evolutionary Bases for Sustainable Behavior: Implications for 
Marketing, Policy, and Social Entrepreneurship, supra note 92, at 118 (“Natural selection does 
not care about the survival of the species; what matters is the replication of one’s genes, which 
often comes at the expense of the survival of others’ genes[.]” (citation omitted)). 
 94  See id. at 119 (explaining reciprocal altruism). 
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for status, regardless of the absolute level of resources obtained.95 Since 
excessive and costly behavior is a way to signal individual quality and access 
to resources (“costly signaling theory”96), this may provide one explanation 
for excessive consumption. However, more qualitative aspects of 
consumption such as the purchase of eco-labeled products may signal 
altruism and cooperativeness, characteristics that may also be attractive for 
potential partners. Achievement of status from such “competitive altruism”97 
represents an interesting aspect of pro-environmental consumption that may 
be used in policy. Both costly signaling and competitive altruism, however, 
rely on a visibility of the signal to other people, in order to mediate the 
message that results in increased status. That people are responsive in their 
behavior to the presence of real or imaginary others is indicated by studies 
showing that eye images increases the willingness to behave altruistically.98 
In the context of pro-environmental consumption and purchase of eco-
labeled products, this emphasizes the importance of making such 
consumption visible to others, either at the site of purchase or in the 
subsequent use of the product. Purchase of green products signals both a 
willingness and ability to buy products that benefit others at a personal cost, 
and this may activate status motives for exhibiting pro-environmental 
behavior. In a recent study, Griskevicius et al. reported that that the effect of 
activating status interacted with the relative cost of the green product.99 
Status activation increased the desire to purchase more when the product 
was expensive relative to a non-green comparative product. This suggests 
that attempts to lower the price of eco-labeled products may not necessarily 
be a successful strategy. Rather, the higher price of many ecological 
products may contribute to status, given that purchase of the product allows 
signaling by being visible to others. 
The third tendency of the human mind discussed by Griskevicius et al. 
is to copy other’s behavior.100 This tendency has been interpreted as an 
evolved adaptive strategy facilitating learning,101 and is also closely related to 
the development of norms (discussed below). An example of copying 
behavior is the well-known study of towel reuse in hotels,102 and neighbors’ 
 
 95  Id. at 120. 
 96  Id. (citing AMOTZ ZAHAVI & AVISHAG ZAHAVI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE: A MISSING PIECE OF 
DARWIN’S PUZZLE (Oxford University Press 1997)) 
 97  Mark Van Vugt, Gilbert Roberts & Charlie Hardy, Competitive Altruism: A Theory of 
Reputation-Based Cooperation in Groups, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
531, 534 (Robin Dunbar & Louise Barrett eds., Oxford University Press 2007). 
 98  Kate L. Powell et al., Eye Images Increase Charitable Donations: Evidence from an 
Opportunistic Field Experiment in a Supermarket, 118 ETHOLOGY 1096, 1096–97 (2012); Melissa 
Bateson et al., Do Images of ‘Watching Eyes’ Induce Behaviour That is More Pro-Social or More 
Normative? A Field Experiment on Littering, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at 1, 7.  
 99  Griskevicius et al., Going Green to Be Seen: Status, Reputation, and Conspicuous 
Conservation, supra note 90, at 392–96 . 
 100  Griskevicius et al., The Evolutionary Bases for Sustainable Behavior: Implications for 
Marketing, Policy, and Social Entrepreneurship, supra note 92, at 121.  
 101  Id. 
 102  Noah J. Goldstein et al., A Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate 
Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 472, 472–73 (2008). 
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behaviors often predict environmental behavior better than personal 
attitudes.103 Copying behavior may also be pronounced by connecting 
behavior to perceived “leaders” and celebrities.104 
The fourth tendency is that humans are inclined to discount events 
(benefits or costs) that lie in the distant future, and put more value on the 
present.105 This makes sense in an evolutionary perspective simply because 
concern about the distant future has had no selective value during human 
evolution. Arguments about the importance of pro-environmental 
consumption are therefore expected to be more effective if they refer to 
present life (e.g., health and well-being, status) rather than to the future. This 
clearly is in contrast to most sustainability arguments, which refer to 
concerns about our future society. Also, evolutionary theories about the 
adaptation of the human mind predict that individual humans should be 
more concerned about environmental issues that are not only proximate in 
time, but also in space (spatial discounting), and have direct effect on the 
individual, compared to issues that are spatially distant.106 
The latter aspect also connects to the fifth tendency of the human mind 
to disregard impalpable concerns, problems that are diffuse in effect and are 
not directly experienced by our senses. Climate change belongs to this 
category as well as environmental hazards such as pollution that are not 
recognized by our sensory and cognitive systems. Many of these hazards 
were not present in the environment in which we evolved, and the effects of 
an individual’s behavior were more immediate and tangible than in today’s 
society. We are therefore not well equipped from our evolutionary history to 
recognize and handle many of the environmental problems that we face 
today. 
In summary, several messages of relevance for eco-labeling emerge 
from considering the five proposed evolutionary based tendencies of the 
human mind. First, reference to kin may activate an interest to buy pro-
environmental products. Second, visibility of purchase situations or use of 
the product (e.g., clothes) may increase the attractivity to buy by signaling 
competitive altruism. Third, a higher price of eco-labeled products may not 
necessarily prevent consumer choice, but under some conditions rather 
improve attractivity by signaling access to resources. Fourth, the tendency 
of humans to copy behavior of others may be used to promote pro-
environmental norms, again relying on visibility of the consumer choice. 
Fifth, even though eco-labeling ultimately aims at promoting long-term 
 
 103  Jessica M. Nolan et al., Normative Social Influence Is Underdetected, 34 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 913, 913–15, 920–22 (2008). 
 104  See MIKAEL KLINTMAN, CITIZEN-CONSUMERS AND EVOLUTION. REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL 
HARM THROUGH OUR SOCIAL MOTIVATION 60–61 (2013) (explaining the theory of looking to 
celebrities and perceived leaders regarding how to be environmentally conscious). 
 105  Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 351, 351–56 (2002) (discussing different models of the discount function). 
 106  Dustin J. Penn, The Evolutionary Roots of Our Environmental Problems: Toward a 
Darwinian Ecology, 78 THE Q. REV. OF BIOLOGY 275, 276–77, 292, 294 (2003) (discussing how 
humans discount future problems); Joel T. Heinen & Roberta S. Low, Human Behavioural 
Ecology and Environmental Conservation, 19 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 105, 111 (1992). 
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sustainable consumption, framing eco-label messages in more proximate 
and tangible terms may be more successful. 
To our knowledge, no studies on eco-labeling have been framed in an 
evolutionary psychology context. However, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that information, e.g., in terms of eco-labeling, is not enough to promote pro-
environmental consumption, and that behavioral interventions are needed.107 
In this change towards an understanding of consumer choice based on 
behavioral sciences, evolutionary psychology and related evolutionary 
sciences (e.g., human behavioral ecology, evolutionary anthropology) should 
play an important role, by complementing the proximate theories and 
explanations from social sciences with ultimate evolutionary explanations 
based on evolutionary theory. These proximate and ultimate sciences should 
really be seen as complementary, not opposed, scientific perspectives. As 
should be clear from the above description of some tendencies of the human 
mind derived from evolutionary theory, the social context is predicted to 
play a very important role in human behavioral decisions. Promotion of 
social norms for green consumption may therefore prove to be more 
successful than attempts to influence individuals as autonomous entities.108 
Although the discourse on human behavior as well as environmental policies 
are still dominated by theories from behavioral economics and 
social/cognitive psychology, evolutionary sciences are slowly beginning to 
be recognized. The resulting multi-disciplinary approach to human behavior 
may provide a better foundation for developing effective interventions for 
pro-environmental consumption, including eco-labeling strategies where 
human tendencies are used strategically rather than opposed. 
B. Eco-labeling and Behavioral Law and Economics 
Behavioral law and economics constitutes another body of research 
with the potential to inform eco-label design and implementation. 
Traditional law and economics hypothesizes that individuals behave in 
rational ways—by gathering optimal information to maximize utility from a 
stable set of preferences—and anticipates the legal implications of this 
rational maximizing behavior.109 Consistent with traditional law-and-
economics principles, “[t]he existing literature on ecolabeling and green 
consumerism . . . has often been framed within a classical market context in 
which price and quality are the drivers of consumer choice.”110 Behavioral 
law and economics “explore[s] the implications of actual (not hypothesized) 
human behavior for the law[,]” drawing from the social sciences to identify 
ways that individuals consistently depart from the rational actor model for a 
 
 107  Gilles Grolleau et al., Helping Eco-Labels to Fulfill Their Promises, 16 CLIMATE POL’Y 792, 
798–99 (2016). 
 108  See, e.g., KLINTMAN, supra note 104, at 129–30. 
 109  See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1476 (1998). 
 110  Fredrick Carlsson & Olof Johansson-Stenman, Behavioral Economics and Environmental 
Policy, 4 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 75, 81 (2012). 
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variety of reasons.111 An extensive body of scholarship considers human 
behavioral tendencies and their implications for law and policy, including 
the environmental context.112 Initially focused on identifying common 
cognitive errors or “bounds” on human behavior,113 behavioral law and 
economics has evolved to emphasize “the relationship between human 
behavior and the social background” and to consider whether and how it 
might be possible to influence, or “nudge,” behavior by changing that 
background through “choice architecture.”114 Some of the insights to emerge 
from this literature that may be particularly relevant with respect to 
informing eco-label design and implementation are described in more detail 
below.115 
1. Interpreting Labels 
A core insight for eco-labeling from behavioral law and economics is 
the recognition that consumers’ decisions do not simply “depend on the 
relationship between economic incentives and underlying preferences” (i.e., 
the cost of a good, the attributes of a good, desire to help the 
environment).116 Consumers often base their decisions on predictably 
irrational judgments.117 Eco-label design should accordingly account for the 
common cognitive short-cuts, errors, and/or behavioral tendencies of 
consumers. 
The manner in which information is presented on labels (or framed) 
can significantly impact whether and how consumers attend to, understand, 
 
 111  Jolls et al., supra note 109, at 1476–77. 
 112  See, e.g., Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, supra note 110, at 86, 92; Cass R. Sunstein & 
Lucia A. Reisch, Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 127, 141 (2014) (arguing for the green “default” in some circumstances); 
Amanda R. Carrico et al., Energy and Climate Change: Key Lessons for Implementing the 
Behavioral Wedge, 2 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 61, 64–65 (2011). 
 113  This includes bounded rationality (cognitive limitations and the mechanisms developed 
to accommodate the same, such as the use of rules of thumb), bounded willpower (difficulties 
planning for long-term interests and the mechanisms to mitigate the same), and bounded self-
interest (concern about the behavior of others centered on fairness). Jolls et al., supra note 109, 
at 1476–80. 
 114  E.g., Lucia Reisch & Cass R. Sunstein, Redesigning Cockpits: Introduction to Special 
Issue of Journal of Consumer Policy on Behavioural Economics, Environmental Policy and the 
Consumer, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 333, 335, 339 (2014); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 99–102 (2008). 
 115  Norm theory provides the basis for some behavioral insights that have been incorporated 
into behavioral law and economics. There is, however, a stand-alone norm literature that 
developed independently and is treated separately below. For a discussion of the wide range of 
fields that can contribute insights about departures from the traditional rational actor model, 
including behavioral economics and norm theory, see Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Regulation 
in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 717–18 (2011) (explaining their use of the term 
“behavioral science” to refer to a wide range of fields, including behavioral economics, 
behavioral and social sciences, sociology, and social psychology). 
 116  Sunstein & Reisch, Automatically Green, supra note 112, at 128. 
 117  See, e.g., Carrico et al., supra note 112, at 65 (“[I]ndividuals reliably prefer certain 
choices to others based on how those choices are framed . . . often invok[ing] systematic 
deviations from what neoclassical economists would view as rational[.]”). 
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and respond to labels.118 One recently documented example is the effect of 
two behavioral tendencies, anchoring and loss aversion, on consumers’ 
interpretations of energy efficiency labels.119 Anchoring refers to the 
observation that “[i]n many situations, people make estimates by starting 
from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer.”120 Loss 
aversion refers to the observation that people tend to value losses more than 
gains.121 When the scale used in the European energy label for electrical 
appliances was updated, changing from a closed scale depicting energy 
efficiency from A to G to an extended scale depicting energy efficiency from 
A+++ to D, anchoring and loss aversion may have combined to “weaken[] 
the label, resulting in consumers attaching less importance to energy 
efficiency[:]”122 
Specifically, psychological theory and research suggests that there is a risk that 
the letter A becomes an anchor for consumers’ judgment of energy efficiency in 
the sense that all categories labelled with an A are perceived as more or less 
the same, irrespective of the number of plusses added. That would lead to steps 
beyond A (A+ to A+++) being wrongly perceived as smaller than the steps 
between categories labelled with different letters. If the class A labelling has 
become the standard or reference point that the energy labelling of a piece of 
equipment is compared to, an energy class below A might be perceived as a 
loss and one beyond A as a gain. Since losses loom larger than gains, this would 
lead to improvements in energy class beyond A being valued less than a similar 
improvement below A.123 
An experimental study of Danish consumers confirmed this hypothesis, 
revealing that under the updated efficiency scale, the same change in energy 
efficiency had “less than half of the impact of the original scale” with respect 
to increasing the likelihood of choosing a more energy efficient TV set.124 The 
updated scale used on the labels thus presents the same information to 
consumers but in a different format that intersects in unfortunate ways with 
individuals’ cognitive tendencies to reduce the effectiveness of the label at 
prompting consumers to choose the most energy efficient product. 
Generalized to other contexts, these results caution that in the design of eco-
 
 118  Folke Ölander & John Thøgersen, Information Versus Nudging in Environmental Policy, 
37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 341, 345 (2014) (“[T]here is research documenting that the design of an 
eco-label has an impact on how consumers perceive the information it aims to convey and 
consequently on their behavior[.]”(citations omitted)); Carrico et al., supra note 112, at 65 (“A 
large and growing body of literature suggests that even when the expected utility of a set of 
options is identical, individuals reliably prefer certain choices to others based on how those 
choices are framed.” (footnote omitted)). 
 119  See, e.g., Ölander & Thøgersen, supra note 118, at 345–48 (describing anchoring effects 
on consumer perception). 
 120  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 14 (Kahneman et al., eds., 1982). 
 121  See Ölander & Thøgersen, supra note 118, at 344. 
 122  Id. at 349. 
 123  Id. at 346 (citation omitted). 
 124  Id. at 346–49. 
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labels, relying on a central point of reference for communicating about the 
environmental attributes of a good will tend to over-emphasize the eco-
shortcomings of goods below that reference point, and under-emphasize the 
eco-superiority of goods exceeding it. 
The above example illustrates how cognitive errors can intersect with 
label design to shape how consumers understand and value the 
environmental attributes of a good. There may also be value in 
understanding the potential for labels to overcome cognitive errors or 
behavioral tendencies where they tend to irrationally discourage consumers 
from preferring environmentally-superior goods. In many cases, energy 
efficient products cost more to purchase but save consumers money over 
the life of the product (in the form of avoided energy costs).125 
Consumers, however, are notoriously bad at factoring those future 
savings into their purchasing decision as a result of a cognitive tendency 
termed hyperbolic discounting.126 Research confirms that “relative to the 
higher up-front cost of purchasing a more efficient appliance, consumers 
tend to devalue savings achieved through lower operating costs at a rate that 
is well above market value.”127 Labels for energy efficient products may, 
therefore, need to be designed to account for and overcome the tendency of 
consumers to steeply discount savings from the reduced cost to operate 
those products. It may thus be important for labels on energy efficient 
products to clearly communicate lifecycle costs at the point of sale.128 It may 
also be helpful to “frame” the decision to purchase energy efficient 
appliances “as an opportunity to avoid future losses rather than to achieve 
future gains . . . .”129 
Many other behavioral tendencies have been documented that may be 
relevant to understanding consumer response to label design, including a 
host of heuristics (availability, affect, elimination, recognition), 
representativeness, the endowment effect, and optimism bias.130 The 
complex interaction of these human behavioral tendencies with eco-labels 
may be difficult to predict yet integral to the performance of a label. It seems 
clear, then, that eco-label design and implementation should reflect not only 
 
 125  See, e.g., Purchasing Energy-Efficient Commercial Dishwashers, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, OFF. 
OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://perma.cc/6QFM-BH3L (last updated Dec. 
2015). 
 126  Nadia Ameli & Nicola Brandt, What Impedes Household Investment in Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy?, in OECD ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS NO. 1222 5, 19 
(2015) (citing to a study suggesting that “hyperbolic discounting could be an explanation for 
underinvestment in energy efficiency”). 
 127  Carrico et al., supra note 112, at 64. 
 128  Id.; see also Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, supra note 115, at 746–
47 (“Research in the social and behavioral sciences suggests that well-designed information, 
particularly when provided at the point of decisionmaking, can help to overcome steep discount 
rates or may prime the individual to consider operating costs when making decisions about 
product purchase and use.”). 
 129  Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, supra note 115, at 775. 
 130  See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas 
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 763–67 
(2003). 
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environmental expertise (with respect to understanding the relevant effects 
of consumer goods on the environment) but also psychological and 
sociological expertise (with respect to understanding the influence of labels 
on consumer behavior).131 
2. The Cognitive Demands of Choosing 
Another core insight from behavioral law and economics for eco-label 
policy is that purchasing decisions can impose cognitive demands that 
individuals seek to minimize or avoid.132 It imposes costs on consumers to 
engage in environmentally-motivated “active choosing” about their 
purchases; they must seek out, read, understand and value information 
about the environmental attributes of products.133 That this is so undergirds 
some important observations about human behavior and eco-labeling. First, 
it should be recognized that, conceptually, eco-labels function as choice 
architecture. Choice architecture refers to interventions in the social 
background that influence, but preserve, choice.134 The use of point-of-sale 
eco-labels constitutes choice architecture because it allows consumers to 
choose eco-conscious products with as little effort as they might choose 
conventional products. Eco-labels reduce the decision burdens on 
environmentally-conscious individuals by collecting and presenting 
environmental information about products; those individuals need not seek 
out that information themselves. Eco-labels thus reduce the informational 
demands for eco-conscious shoppers, thereby generating through choice 
architecture conditions more favorable to environmentally-friendly choice. 
Additionally, the cognitive demands associated with active choosing 
can help to explain the power of the affect heuristic in environmental 
purchasing decisions. The affect heuristic, sometimes referred to as 
“choosing by liking,” refers to the idea that individuals sometimes make 
choices not through “a cognitive procedure involving an analysis of an 
option’s constituent features[,]” but instead “intuitively[,] by the 
spontaneous affective evaluation of liking or disliking that options may 
elicit . . . .”135 This “qualifies as an automated decision heuristic because 
affective impressions are readily available and provide an easier basis for 
 
 131  Carrico et al., supra note 112, at 65 (“[P]olicymakers should consult psychologists or 
behavioral economists when developing messages that frame choices.”). 
 132  See generally Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, supra note 115, at 
747, 758 (describing the importance of cognitive costs for behavior generally, observing that 
“[t]raditional rational-actor models tend to underestimate the cognitive costs of seeking out and 
evaluating information, as well as the cognitive benefit of avoiding hassles” and discussing the 
power of habits that “often supplement the cognitive process of decisionmaking or even 
override attitudinal preferences and normative influence on behavior”); see also Reisch et al., 
supra note 6, at 11 (describing the complexity and volume of information and choice regarding 
food consumption and observing that “many consumers report being overwhelmed and would 
rather adhere to their habitual choices” (citation omitted)). 
 133  See Sunstein & Reisch, Automatically Green, supra note 112, at 141–42. 
 134  Reisch & Sunstein, Redesigning Cockpits, supra note 114, at 335. 
 135  Shane Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 550 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). 
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decisions than a deliberate cognitive assessment of each option . . . .”136 For 
the environmentally concerned, “[d]enominating a product a green choice 
may be sufficient to create a kind of brand that sparks a ‘warm glow[,]’” 
inviting individuals to make a “rapid, automatic judgment” in favor of a 
product without subjecting that choice to careful consideration.137 In these 
accounts, the association between product, environment, and personal 
benefit is not closely or critically examined; it is, instead, emotional and 
intuitive. 
This suggests two points of caution for the designers of eco-labels. 
First, designing labels to provide additional—accurate and sometimes 
detailed—information about a product’s environmental attributes may be 
irrelevant, or even counterproductive, if it forces consumers into active 
choosing and/or exposes a false association (many consumers, for example, 
might be surprised to learn that organic does not mean healthier).138 Second, 
for some consumers a green label may cue a negative intuitive, emotional 
(affective) response. The information presented in labels can “interact with 
an individual’s previous experiences or ideological worldview to trigger 
certain responses.”139 For example, the term “tax” can spur a negative 
reaction, particularly in conservative individuals; using the term “offset” 
instead can avoid this reaction and “[c]onsequentially, more Republicans 
and Independents are willing to purchase a more expensive product when its 
cost is inflated due to a ‘carbon offset’ rather than a ‘carbon tax.’”140 
Likewise, an empirical study of the effect of “nudge” designed to reduce 
home energy use through the distribution of home energy reports 
(comparing a household’s energy usage to other similarly situated 
households), revealed “that environmental nudges are most effective in 
relatively liberal communities. What works in California may not work in 
Lubbock, Texas.”141 Thus, it should be recognized that the affect heuristic 
can cut both for and against purchase of an eco-labeled good depending 
upon the consumer’s preexisting attitudes. 
Finally, the cognitive demands of active choosing help to explain the 
power of defaults. The most powerful “label” of all may be the designation of 
the default choice, which also represents a form of “nudge.” Studies reveal 
that setting green energy as the default for utility consumers’ energy source, 
 
 136  Id. at 554 (citation omitted). 
 137  Sunstein & Resich, Automatically Green, supra note 112, at 130 (emphasis omitted) 
(citing to DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–22 (2011)). 
 138  For example, the USDA Organic Seal expressly does not endorse the idea that organic 
certified foods are healthier than non-organic alternatives. See Miles McEvoy, Organic 101: 
What the USDA Organic Label Means, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. (Mar. 22, 2012), https://perma.cc/CSU6-
29JQ (lacking superiority claims); see also Ulf Hjelmar, Consumers’ Purchase of Organic Food 
Products: A Matter of Convenience and Reflexive Practices, 56 APPETITE 336, 341 (2010) 
(describing studies finding that organics are not healthier or more nutritious). 
 139  Carrico et al., supra note 112, at 65. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Energy Conservation “Nudges” and Environmentalist 
Ideology: Evidence From a Randomized Residential Electricity Field Experiment, 11 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N 680, 698 (2013). 
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and requiring them to opt out to choose lower cost gray-sourced energy, has 
a very powerful effect, significantly increasing the number of consumers 
choosing green energy.142 The power of defaults is hypothesized to arise from 
a number of factors, including that individuals presume “the default was 
chosen by someone sensible and for a good reason[,]” are inclined to inertia 
because departing from the default requires an active choice with the 
associated cognitive demands, and interpret the default as a reference point 
with departures therefrom weighed more heavily as losses (because of the 
anchoring effect and loss aversion).143 
With respect to most consumer goods (food, clothes, sundries) there is 
no formal government-determined default from which a consumer must opt 
out to make a different choice. However, it is interesting to consider the 
extent to which a host of background factors give rise to near-default status 
for certain gray goods.144 In some sense, that we must label environmentally-
friendly goods to flag eco-attributes signals that traditional gray goods are 
the default and eco-goods are the opt-out. And it is possible to think of many 
other ways in which it is tacitly suggested that eco-goods present the opt-
out. Think, for example, of the layout of a traditional supermarket. Organic 
or “natural” foods are often grouped in a special section or aisle with 
offerings typically comparatively smaller than those of traditional foods. The 
baseline for eco-labeling and the practical treatment of eco-goods may thus 
put them at an inherent disadvantage by suggesting that traditional goods 
are the default and eco-goods the opt-out. Imagine, for example, 
unsustainably sourced foods were required to bear a label proclaiming that 
status and segregated into a small corner of the supermarket. 
C. Eco-labeling and Norm Theory 
Norm theory is a related body of research that likewise offers insight 
for eco-label design and implementation. Norms are obligations that guide 
behavior even in the absence of a formal legal rule.145 These normative 
constraints are ubiquitous yet often “so taken for granted that they seem 
invisible.”146 Individuals regularly, for example, tip their waiters, remove their 
hat when entering a church, walk on the right side of the sidewalk, choose 
the subway seat that leaves the most space between themselves and other 
passengers, and cover their mouth when sneezing. Norms are the invisible 
hand guiding these quite uniformly followed—but not legally compelled—
behaviors. Norms can provide an alternative to, supplement, or shape 
responses to formal legal rules and a large body of legal scholarship 
explores how norms develop, function, and relate to formal legal rules and 
 
 142  Sunstein & Reisch, Automatically Green, supra note 112, at 135–37. 
 143  Id. at 140–44. 
 144  Or perhaps merely evidence or signal that most choose the gray option, thereby 
potentially invoking descriptive norms. 
 145  See Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal 
Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001). 
 146  Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 912 (1996). 
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behavior.147 A smaller, but still substantial, literature has focused more 
specifically on how norms intersect with individual environmental 
behaviors.148 
Despite this sustained scholarly attention, much remains to be learned 
about the mechanisms through which norms arise and influence behavior. It 
is possible, however, to offer a general account of how many scholars 
believe norms function. Individuals are theorized to hold general, broad or 
abstract norms, values or preferences that support and find expression as 
narrower concrete norms, or specific behaviors.149 For example, an 
individual possessed of the abstract norm of environmental protection might 
carry a reusable cloth bag to the market; the use of a reusable bag is a 
specific behavior, or concrete norm, followed by the individual to give 
expression to the underlying abstract norm of environmental protection held 
by the individual. Norms can thus be grounded in values or beliefs held by 
the individual (personal or internal norms).150 
Norms can also be grounded in beliefs about the expectations (or 
anticipated response) of others (social or external norms).151 For an 
 
 147  E.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 2–4 (2000); Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of 
Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000); 
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); 
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, 
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997). 
 148  E.g., Carlson, supra note 22; Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving 
the Environment, supra note 16; Hope M. Babcock, Civic Republicanism Provides Theoretical 
Support for Making Individuals More Environmentally Responsible, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 515 (2009); Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A Civic Republican Moment 
for Achieving Broader Changes in Environmental Behavior, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009); 
Andrew Green, Creating Environmentalists: Environmental Law, Identity and Commitment, 17 
J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 1 (2006); Andrew Green, Norms, Institutions, and the Environment, 57 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 105, 107 (2007); Andrew Green, Self Control, Individual Choice, and Climate 
Change, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 77 (2008); Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, 
Environmental Law, and Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407 (2006); Albert C. Lin, 
Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135, 1136 (2009); Michael P. Vandenbergh 
et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2008) 
(recommending targeting individual behavior through information distribution); Vandenbergh & 
Steinemann, supra note 11, at 1678 (advocating a norm campaign grounded in the abstract norm 
of personal responsibility and designed to support a concrete norm of carbon neutrality); 
Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms, supra note 16; Jed S. Ela, Comment, Law and 
Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence to Minimize GHG Emissions, 27 UCLA 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93 (2009). 
 149  Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 11, at 1706 (identifying this distinction as one of 
the “fundamental understandings” around which “[n]orms scholars have begun to converge”). 
 150  Green, Norms, Institutions, and the Environment, supra note 148, at 113 (“Individuals 
follow external norms because of sanction by the community. For example, such sanction could 
occur through the granting or withholding of esteem . . . . Internal social norms, on the other 
hand, are those that are self-sanctioned by the individual, such as through a feeling of guilt or 
shame when not following the norm or a good feeling when following the norm.”). 
 151  See id. at 112–13 (explaining that external norms create the threat of sanction by the 
community); see also McAdams, supra note 147, at 376–78 (describing community endorsement 
and internalization of social norms); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 11, at 1706–07 
(discussing social norms and the influence of expected social sanctions and rewards). 
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individual who chooses to use reusable shopping bags because he or she 
believes it is the right thing to do, reusable bag use expresses a personal 
norm and may reaffirm self-concept, create a sense of satisfaction, and avoid 
the discomfort of acting against one’s beliefs (cognitive dissonance). For an 
individual who chooses to use a reusable shopping bag because of how she 
believes others will perceive and respond to that choice, reusable bag use 
reflects compliance with a social norm and the individual likely anticipates 
that compliance will result in favorable esteem from others. Scholars posit 
that individuals contemplating a behavior often engage in a rough utility 
calculus in which the benefit of compliance with personal and social norms 
is weighed along with a variety of other factors, such as monetary cost and 
convenience.152 When these factors weigh against compliance with a norm, 
they can be understood as “barriers.” Even an individual who wishes to 
protect the environment and believes that use of reusable bags helps to do 
so (personal norm) and wishes to use reusable bags to avoid perceived 
social opprobrium associated with plastic bag use (social norm) may 
sometimes choose to use a plastic bag, for example, when she realizes after 
getting to the store that she has forgotten her reusable bag and finds it too 
inconvenient to return home (inconvenience barrier). 
Many other attributes of norms have been theorized that build upon this 
general framework. Two of these that may be particularly relevant with 
respect to thinking about how norm theory can inform eco-label design and 
implementation—visibility and context—are described in more detail below. 
1. Visibility 
One possibility for increasing consumer purchases of eco-labeled goods 
is to enhance the influence of desirable social norms on purchasing 
behavior. There appears to be growing recognition that simply providing 
consumers with information about the environmental attributes of goods 
through eco-labels often does not suffice to change consumer purchasing 
decisions.153 One explanation for this result is that for information about the 
 
 152  See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 11, at 1,697–98; Vandenbergh et al., 
Regulation in the Behavioral Era, supra note 115, at 760–62 (describing socio-ecological 
frameworks that influence individual behavior); see also Cooter, supra note 147, at 7–8 
(discussing the benefits, including avoiding social sanctions, and costs of obeying a norm); Lin, 
supra note 148, at 1160–61 (explaining that external factors can limit behavioral choices even 
where a concrete norm has been activated). 
 153  E.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 35 (observing that 
“there are indications that the approach of ‘providing consumers with information’ in order to 
make decisions is not sufficient to bring about changes in consumption behaviour”); Reisch & 
Sunstein, Redesigning Cockpits, supra note 114, at 339 (commenting on the acknowledgment by 
others that “information has not been proven to be a very successful means of promoting 
voluntary behavior change to protect the environment”); Carrico et al., supra note 112, at 64 
(“Although simply providing information to consumers is rarely sufficient to change behavior, 
accurate and actionable information is often a necessary component to achieving this end.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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public environmental attributes154 of a good to change consumption 
decisions relies largely on personal norms to change behavior—labels 
provide information to consumers to allow them to exercise a preference 
(personal norm) for environmental protection. For a personal norm to 
change consumption choice, the consumer must hold the personal norm and 
connect the consumption decision to the personal norm; additionally, the 
value of the benefit associated with acting in conformance with that 
personal norm (sometimes referred to as “intrinsic value”155 or “self-
conception”156) and other values associated with purchase of the good must 
outweigh barriers and competing motivations.157 Thus, an eco-label designed 
simply to communicate information about public environmental attributes to 
the consumer may only speak to the subset of individuals concerned about 
environmental protection and then change the ultimate purchasing decision 
of only the number of that subset for whom the value of the eco-friendly 
purchase outweighs any barriers, or competing considerations, such as cost. 
Personal environmental norms, standing alone, simply may not be 
sufficiently widespread or strong enough to overcome barriers to eco-
friendly consumption choices,158 particularly if, as some have posited, 
individuals feel less obligated by personal norms in the consumer, as 
opposed to civic, context.159 
Eco-label policy that activates social as well as personal norms could 
expand the number of consumers open to a label’s influence beyond those 
who hold a personal norm of environmental protection. It could also 
increase the value of purchasing an eco-labeled product for individuals who 
hold a personal norm of environmental protection, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that the value of the eco-conscious purchasing decision will 
outweigh any costs (barriers). And many have posited that, once invoked, 
social norms can achieve relatively swift, widespread changes in behavior 
 
 154  Public environmental attributes refer to those that benefit the environment or world 
generally; private attributes refer to those that accrue directly to individuals (such as the 
perceived personal health benefit of avoiding exposure to pesticides by consuming organic 
foods). Grolleau et al., Too Much of a Good Thing? Why Altruism Can Harm the Environment?, 
68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2145, 2146 (2009). 
 155  Cooter, supra note 147, at 7 (distinguishing between internalized norm compliance which 
provides intrinsic value to individuals, and external norms from which individuals derive 
instrumental value from compliance). 
 156  Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 146, at 916. 
 157  See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 11, at 1708 (“[A] sense of obligation may lead 
to the formation of a behavioral intention without actually changing behavior. Other barriers 
may exist, such as the effort involved, a lack of infrastructure, social costs, or financial costs. 
Other social norms also can serve as barriers.” (footnote omitted)). 
 158  See generally Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough, supra note 148, at 414–15 (evaluating 
the strength of the environmental protection norm in the United States); Vandenbergh & 
Steinemann, supra note 11, at 1713 (“Given the vast number of people who must change their 
behavior, the challenge posted by climate change is to identify abstract norms that are 
sufficiently widespread to influence individuals who do not identify with environmentalism.”). 
 159  See Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 146, at 924 (discussing why 
individuals may be more likely to press collective interests in their role as citizen even while not 
conforming their private practices to the same standard). 
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(through the “bandwagon effect” or norm cascades), particularly when 
championed by influential individuals, or norm entrepreneurs.160 
Social norms, however, typically exert influence only where behavior is 
visible to others.161 This is so because individuals follow social norms with an 
eye to how others perceive their behavior—they change their behavior out 
of deference to a social norm to avoid the disapproval or obtain the approval 
of others.162 When relevant others do not witness a behavior, no social 
judgment or value can attach and the benefit of complying with the social 
norm may not be factored into the decision. Consistent with this, some 
research describes a “green to be seen” effect whereby environmentalists 
engage in more pro-environmental behavior when watched.163 To deploy the 
influence of social norms on decisions about the purchase of eco-labeled 
goods it may, therefore, be necessary or helpful to recognize visibility as an 
important variable, create or increase visibility where possible and, where 
not possible, to understand that the absence of visibility constrains 
possibilities for deploying social norms (and perhaps eco-labels) effectively 
in that context. 
The visibility of eco-consumption, and the potential for labels to change 
the same, depends greatly on product and context. Visibility of a consumer’s 
eco-conscious choice will be high where the good is publicly purchased and 
used by the consumer and the eco-attributes of the good are apparent. Thus, 
for example, a Tesla or Prius is typically purchased and driven by the car 
owner in public and its eco-attributes are obvious, although communicated 
not by a label, but by distinctive car design and public brand knowledge.164 
All of these factors lead to high visibility and suggest that social norms can 
be powerful in this context. 
Visibility will be lower where products are not purchased and/or used 
publicly and where the environmental attributes of the product are not 
apparent. There is, for example, typically less visibility with respect to food 
and sundries such as cleaners, toilet paper, paper towels, etc. Use of many of 
these types of products occurs within the home and is therefore not 
generally visible to others. Additionally, many of these products are taken 
out of their package for use/consumption causing the eco-attributes to no 
longer be apparent. (If served broccoli at a friend’s home, one will not 
know—short of inquiring—if it is organic.) Even the act of purchasing 
products may not be visible if done on-line using a grocery delivery service. 
 
 160  Id. at 929–30. 
 161  See Ela, supra note 148, at 118–21 (observing that visibility is “determinative of norm 
formation” in leading norm theories and noting that “according to both leading theories of norm 
origins, social influences can begin wherever behavior is visible”). 
 162  Id. 
 163  Cameron Brick et al., 51 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 226, 228 (2017). 
 164  Steven E. Sexton & Alison L. Sexton, Conspicuous Conservation: The Prius Effect and 
Willingness to Pay for Environmental Bona Fides, 2 (Apr. 21, 2011) (unpublished paper) (on file 
with Environmental Law) (describing how the “unique design” of the Prius has “historically 
provided the most powerful signal of the owner’s affinity for the environment of any vehicle in 
the U.S.”).  
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It is interesting to consider how eco-label policies might increase 
visibility to enhance the influence of social norms with respect to food and 
sundries. For foods that are more commonly consumed in public, can the 
environmental attributes of a product be communicated more effectively to 
others? Imagine for example if, like the Tesla or Prius, there was a 
distinctive package shape allowed only for eco-certified items. Are there 
ways to enhance the visibility of eco-conscious purchasing at the 
supermarket? What if, in addition to the 10 items or fewer express line, 
grocery stores maintained eco-lines open only to those purchasing 10 or 
more organic items?165 Or used their loyalty programs to track organic 
purchases and maintained special “green” carts available only to customers 
with a record of green purchases? 
Finally, in addition to using awareness of the power of visibility to 
improve label design and policy to better harness social norms, it may also 
be important to identify those situations in which visibility is not possible 
and to tailor expectations and policy appropriately.166 Where visibility is not 
possible (and there is no unusually appealing private attribute to 
recommend the eco-product), progress in changing consumer behavior may 
need to come from promoting broader acceptance of abstract norms of 
environmental protection, grounding labeling in an alternate abstract norm 
(such as thrift or energy independence) that is more broadly embraced as a 
personal norm, or (perhaps) invoking the power of “reverse” visibility by 
invoking descriptive norms. 
Descriptive norms refer to the propensity of individuals to “follow the 
crowd in the absence of strong preferences that direct them otherwise.”167 
“[C]alling attention to common behaviors within a population (a descriptive 
norm) will induce other individuals to also adopt that behavior[,]”168 
regardless of whether the behavior of those individuals is visible to others. 
Consistent with this descriptive norm, studies of household energy 
consumption have shown that comparing a household’s energy use to that of 
similarly situated neighbors can cause households (both those who deviate 
from the norm through excessive consumption and those who deviate by 
using comparatively less energy) to conform their energy use more closely 
to the norm.169 This can be so even where the individual’s own behavior is 
not visible to others. This thus presents a context of reverse visibility—
 
 165  Although consideration would have to be given to whether such an intervention might 
decrease incentives for those holding a personal norm of environmental protection as a result 
of motivational crowding. See infra notes 185–189 and accompanying text (discussing 
motivational crowding in the context of price subsidies).  
 166  Ela, supra note 148, at 124 (“To a designer of a practical behavior-change program, the 
importance of visibility to social influence has two implications. First, other things being equal, 
scarce resources should be directed toward the most visible behaviors first, since strong social 
influences may make them more promising candidates for change. Second, other things being 
equal, interventions should be designed so as to raise the visibility of less-visible behaviors.”). 
 167  Vandenbergh et al., supra note 115, at 752. 
 168  Id. at 752–53. 
 169  Id. 
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previously invisible information about the behavior of others is made known 
to households whose own behavior remains invisible to peers. 
This phenomenon suggests some possibilities for implementing eco-
labels to take advantage of descriptive norms by publicizing (making visible) 
the behavior of others even when social norms are unlikely to exert 
influence because individual consumption behavior is not readily visible. For 
example, imagine if grocery stores (in physical locations or online 
purchasing applications, like Fresh Direct) publicized the average customer 
“green” score (calculated by percentage of green items purchased per 
customer or a similar metric) and included on receipts an individual’s 
comparative “green” score. Or public service messaging designed to explain 
and encourage the choice of green options emphasized (where possible) the 
growing number of individuals choosing the green option (and, importantly, 
avoided lamenting that common consumption choices contribute to an 
environmental problem as this may only serve to communicate the 
descriptive norm that the environmentally unfriendly consumption is 
common).170 
2. Context 
Visibility of behavior is one aspect of the context, or background 
conditions, for environmental consumption. As noted above, whether 
behavior is visible can significantly change the extent to which social norms 
influence consumption behavior. Other aspects of context may also be 
important for understanding whether and how eco-labels interact with 
norms to influence consumption behavior. 
Context includes the existence and strength of prevailing norms 
(abstract, concrete, personal and social) in a community (defined 
geographically or otherwise).171 “Both existing norms and the ability of 
norms to change depend heavily on the social, economic, and historical 
context of the community in which these norms developed”172 and thus “[t]he 
type of consumption that creates status varies between contexts and time.”173 
 
 170  Id. at 753–54 (observing that “[m]essages are often designed to convey the scale of the 
problem by bringing attention to an undesirable behavior. . . . By doing this, however, a 
campaign may promote the belief that the behavior, though undesirable, is widespread” and 
suggesting that education campaigns could take advantage of descriptive norms by emphasizing 
that the purchase of a green good is “widespread or is becoming widespread” to “signal to 
consumers that not adopting an action will be seen as out of the norm”). 
 171  See Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 146, at 919–22 (describing 
“norm communities” and explaining that different norms may attend to different “social roles”); 
Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, supra note 115, at 761 (explaining the 
concept of socio-ecological frameworks for organizing influences on individual behavior and 
noting that this includes individual factors (such as income), “the community environment 
(including neighborhoods, cities, and states), and the broader national and policy 
environment”). 
 172  Green, Norms, Institutions, and the Environment, supra note 148, at 116. 
 173  Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, supra note 110, at 81 (“Although driving a Toyota Prius 
may, at least in some contexts, provide social status, driving a Rolls-Royce or a new Ferrari 
contributes more to social status in other contexts.”). 
5_TOJCI.KUH (DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2018  6:25 PM 
2018] ECO-LABEL POLICY 443 
The personal value and social meaning of purchasing and using eco-labeled 
goods can vary greatly. Drivers in Berkeley, California (a notoriously eco-
friendly enclave), are likely to hold an abstract and personal norm of 
environmental protection and also a concrete norm connected thereto of 
driving a fuel-efficient vehicle. Additionally, within that community, there is 
also likely a social norm favoring environmental protection and fuel 
efficiency—i.e., drivers in Berkeley are likely to engender social benefits 
from driving a fuel efficient Prius and suffer social penalties from driving a 
gas-guzzling Yukon Denali.174 In other communities, however, individuals 
may be less likely to hold an abstract or personal norm of environmental 
protection or a concrete norm of driving a fuel efficient vehicle flowing 
therefrom, and there may even be a reputational cost to driving a Prius. 
The distribution and strength of background norms may significantly 
affect the extent to which eco-labels influence consumer purchasing 
decisions and therefore if the policy goal is to increase the purchase of 
sustainable goods, policymakers may wish to be strategic about choosing 
the norm in which to ground labels.175 At present, eco-labels appear to largely 
appeal to the abstract norm of environmental protection.176 While logical, this 
little-examined default may not always be wise from a strategic perspective. 
In the United States, for example, “environmental protection norms are 
widespread” but “not universally held”177 and tend to be “shallow.”178 
Moreover, environmentalism has become politicized in the United States 
such that “[p]ro- and anti-environmental identities are social group 
memberships that individuals are motivated to strategically signal, because 
these groups have identifiable clothing, speech, vehicles, and other social 
markers.”179 For some individuals, environmentalism may be an “unwanted 
 
 174  Sexton & Sexton, supra note 164, at 2–3 (discussing the “green halo” produced by 
purchasing a Prius and observing that “a Prius is more valuable in communities with a strong 
green ethos like Berkeley, Calif. than in communities with greater heterogeneity in attitudes 
toward the environment, like, for instance, Bakersfield, Calif.”).  
 175  See Vermeir & Verbeke, supra note 69, at 186–87 (suggesting that messaging about 
sustainable food could be tailored to different consumer segments depending, in part, upon the 
extent to which they might be influenced by social norm pressure). It might also be possible to 
tailor to the educational or social-marketing supporting a labeling regime to appeal more 
broadly to different audiences. Mario F. Teisl et al., Non-dirty Dancing? Interactions Between 
Eco-labels and Consumers, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 140, 142 (2008) (“Heterogeneity in consumer 
reactions to eco-labels is not generally policy relevant as it is not practicable to allow for 
various designs for the same label. However, eco-labeling programs can entail more than just 
the labels per se; they can also include an educational or social-marketing component.”). 
 176  If the goal of eco-labeling is narrowly to advance individual autonomy by giving 
consumers information to connect abstract personal norms to concrete behaviors, thereby 
allowing eco-minded consumers to give effect to a preference for environmental protection, 
then it would be acceptable to simply provide information in understandable ways to speak 
only to those individuals holding a personal norm of environmental protection.  
 177  Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 11, at 1712 (recommending that norm 
management efforts directed to carbon emission reduction should be grounded in an abstract 
norm that is more widespread than that of environmental protection). 
 178  Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough, supra note 148, at 415. 
 179  Brick et al., supra note 163, at 226–27 (citation omitted). 
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identity” causing them to eschew eco-labeled goods, particularly when their 
consumption choices are visible: 
When a person’s identities are aligned with a behavior, e.g., when a liberal has 
the opportunity to buy a ‘green” product, social visibility may increase behavior 
frequency. However, a conservative may choose not to publicly purchase this 
product when conspicuously labeled. 
. . . . 
. . . . 
Individuals in the United States increasingly think that the environmentalist 
movement has done more harm than good, and since 1991 identification with 
environmentalists has decreased steadily to 42%. . . . When negative aspects of 
environmentalism are salient, visibility may overall reduce pro-environmental 
behavior, since individuals will be motivated to maintain their social reputation 
by avoiding the negative category (“brown to keep down”).180 
The ability to persuade consumers to purchase eco-labeled goods 
through appeal to environmental norms is therefore inherently limited 
(unless the environmental protection norm is broadened and strengthened). 
Might there be another, more broadly and/or deeply held abstract norm, 
with greater behavior-influencing potential, in which to ground eco-labels? 
One possibility is to orient eco-labels, where possible, to the norm of 
“personal responsibility not to harm others[,]” which has the benefit of being 
“remarkably widespread across the political spectrum . . . resonat[ing] even 
with those who oppose regulatory solutions to social problems.”181 Label 
design, informational materials, and reports about products might focus, for 
example, on how the improved production processes of sustainable goods 
protect others; instead of a green earth symbol or similar, the label might 
depict a child under an umbrella. Additional research is required into the 
penetration of different abstract norms and the fit between those norms and 
sustainable goods. For present purposes, we raise the idea that it could be 
useful to thoughtfully assess the apparent default decision to ground eco-
labels in an appeal to environmental protection norms. 
Price—including not just cost to the consumer, but also the way that 
the price of a product is presented and explained—is another contextual 
factor that can interact with norms to shape consumer behavior, sometimes 
in complex and unexpected ways. The often increased cost of green goods is 
typically understood as a barrier to eco-consumption—a factor that weighs 
against a green purchasing decision. Research suggests that while a subset 
 
 180  Id. (citations omitted) (publishing the results of a study finding that anti-
environmentalists engaged in fewer pro-environmental behaviors when those behaviors were 
more visible). 
 181  Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 11, at 1712–13 (footnote omitted) 
(recommending that norm management efforts focused on individual carbon neutrality appeal 
to the personal responsibility norm as opposed to environmental protection norms). 
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of consumers are willing to pay more for eco-goods, they are typically not 
willing to pay significant premiums;182 additionally, many scholars studying 
how norms intersect with environmental behaviors have concluded that 
where costs are borne by individuals while environmental benefits are 
widely shared (often termed “large-number, small-payoff collective action” 
problems183), barriers must typically be low for behavior change to occur.184 
Interestingly, however, as described in a theory referred to as 
motivational crowding or crowding-out, price interventions can sometimes 
undercut personal and social norms supporting environmental behaviors.185 
For example, the social message of commitment to environmental 
protection or altruism may be stronger when an individual goes to great 
lengths—for present purposes, pays significantly more—to choose a green 
good (for example, a Tesla). And using subsidies to reduce the cost of green 
goods can have unintended consequences.186 A subsidy designed to prompt 
consumers to purchase a green good might inadvertently cause them to be 
suspicious about the overall quality of the good.187 Subsidies can also 
undercut the intrinsic motivation, grounded in a personal norm, to purchase 
a green good. In one study involving carbon footprint labeling of grocery 
items, consumers were less likely to buy green goods when accompanied by 
an explicit statement that the price had been reduced to reflect an 
environmental subsidy, causing the authors to conclude that “combining 
information on the relative environmental performance of products with a 
monetary reward for switching is less effective than information alone.”188 
On the other hand, well-designed economic policy instruments are also 
hypothesized to have “potential crowding-in effects” that “reinforce[] . . . 
intrinsic motivation.”189 What seems clear is that the intersection between 
 
 182  Cf., Davies et al., supra note 82, at 48 (“Consumers are less likely to brand switch based 
on ethics due to the low priority of ethics in the purchasing decision[.]”). 
 183  Carlson, supra note 22, at 1234 & n.8. 
 184  Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, supra note 
148, at 1715 (“Although many examples exist of costly individual behavior change, studies of 
consumer and nonconsumer environmentally significant behavior suggest that on balance 
individuals will act in their pecuniary interest. . . . Research on recycling and other 
environmentally significant behaviors suggests that behavior change is difficult when sustained 
and substantial changes are necessary.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 185  Carrico et al., supra note 112, at 63 (admonishing that “[p]olicymakers should . . . be 
careful to avoid introducing economic incentives or penalties to change behaviors that may 
already be governed by moral norms” because of the risk of motivational crowding). 
 186  Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough, supra note 148, at 429–35; Sexton & Sexton, supra 
note 164, at 21 (“Because conspicuous-conservation goods enable their purchasers to signal 
their willingness to sacrifice to enhance the environment, the public subsidy of such goods 
diminishes the value of such goods as social signals. Subsidies may, therefore, have the 
perverse effect of reducing demand for conspicuous conservation.”). 
 187  Xiaogu Li et al., The Effect of Mail-in Utility Rebates on Willingness-to-Pay for ENERGY 
STAR® Certified Refrigerators, 63 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 1, 2, 16 (2016). 
 188  Grischa Perino et al., Motivation Crowding in Real Consumption Decisions: Who is 
Messing with My Groceries?, 52 ECON. INQUIRY 592, 602 (2014). 
 189  Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, supra note 110, at 83, 93 (concluding that “although 
intrinsic motives can sometimes be crowded out by monetary incentives, we argue . . . that 
monetary incentives will sometimes amplify intrinsic motivation”). 
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price and behavior is complex and best navigated with caution and the 
benefit of careful research. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ECO-LABELING DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Behavioral insights from evolutionary psychology, behavioral law and 
economics, norm theory, and related research streams converge in a number 
of respects (the importance of visibility and the behavior of others, difficulty 
valuing distant costs and benefits) and suggest a number of possibilities for 
improving eco-label design and implementation. Some of these insights 
could be used to enhance what might be thought of as the traditional, or 
“thin,” understanding of eco-label purpose and function. Under this thin 
understanding, eco-labels provide information about the environmental 
attributes of products to consumers to allow consumers to make choices 
consistent with their environmental preferences. Behavioral insights can 
enhance the way that eco-labels currently perform in this thin capacity by 
improving the extent to which eco-labels help consumers match 
environmental preference to product. 
These research streams also, however, suggest more transformational 
possibilities for using behavioral insights to develop a next generation of 
eco-labels with a “thicker” conception of the purpose and function of eco-
labels. Eco-labels could be understood as a means to substantially grow the 
number of individuals purchasing eco-goods by more actively shaping 
consumer preference (i.e., encouraging more individuals to prefer eco-
labeled products) or communicating non-environmental but desirable 
coexisting product attributes that broaden the segment of consumers to 
whom the product may appeal. This Part describes how behavioral insights 
can enhance eco-labeling as currently understood and redefine eco-labeling 
so as to increase its efficacy. 
A. Behavioral Insights for Enhancing a Thin Conception of Eco-labels 
As traditionally conceived, eco-labels function to enable consumers to 
identify goods that match their environmental preferences. When successful 
under this model, eco-labels present a win-win, reducing environmental 
harms while supporting consumer choice. This thin account of eco-labels is 
consistent with the account provided by norm theory about how and why 
consumers’ purchasing decisions can reflect personal norms. Those holding 
a personal norm of environmental protection derive value from conforming 
their purchasing behavior to their personal belief and weigh that value in 
their purchasing utility calculus.190 
Behavioral law and economics, however, instructs that eco-labels need 
to be carefully designed to avoid cognitive errors on the part of pro-
environment consumers that derail environmental purchasing. Individuals 
possessing a personal norm of environmental protection may be dissuaded 
 
 190  See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text. 
5_TOJCI.KUH (DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2018  6:25 PM 
2018] ECO-LABEL POLICY 447 
by a cognitive error or behavioral tendency from purchasing an eco-good 
that in fact aligns with their environmental preferences. The potential for 
this to occur is illustrated by the response of Danish consumers to changes 
in the European energy label described supra. In that studied example, a 
change in the way that energy efficiency data was presented on the product 
label triggered loss aversion and anchoring effects, artificially reducing the 
impact of energy efficiency on purchasing decisions.191 
Norm theory further suggests the need to be mindful of the relative 
value afforded to environmental norms when consumers make purchases. 
The traditional account of eco-labels is premised on consumers exercising a 
preference for the public good of environmental protection in their 
purchasing decisions. Behavioral insights might also be deployed to 
maximize the extent to which pro-environmental consumer attitudes are 
brought to bear in purchasing decisions. A recent study indicates that 
relatively simple nudges external to the eco-label itself may significantly 
influence the decision of customers to buy green products.192 The study 
showed that grocery store customers could be influenced to buy eco-labeled 
bananas just by brief information (verbal or written) about the eco-labeled 
option.193 Information transmitted by a grocery store employee had a 
stronger effect than information on a sign, but both experimental designs 
increased significantly the choice of the eco-labeled option.194 The 
interpretation of the results was that reminding customers of their pro-
environmental attitudes near the site of purchase may nudge them to make 
choices that are in line with those attitudes, and that the stronger effect from 
a real person transmitting information may have activated a response related 
to the social context (e.g., signaling).195 
Research suggests, however, that the environmental protection norm is 
widespread but shallow,196 and evolutionary psychology suggests that the 
public environmental benefits of eco-goods, which often accrue far away 
temporally or geographically, are likely to be afforded low value.197 In terms 
of thinking about how environmental protection is weighed when a 
consumer is deciding whether to purchase a good, it is useful to understand 
that for many individuals a personal norm favoring environmental protection 
may cause the individual to assign some additional value to purchasing an 
eco-good, but that the additional value may not be great and will often be 
considered alongside other considerations (such as difficulty procuring the 
good or other inconvenience). Even many environmentally-inclined 
consumers may be willing to pay only relatively small premiums for eco-
goods, and in terms of personal environmental behaviors, it is typically 
 
 191  See supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text. 
 192  Per Kristensson et al., Influencing Consumers to Choose Environment Friendly 
Offerings: Evidence from Field Experiments, 76 J. BUS. RES. 89, 93 (2017). 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. at 94. 
 195  Id. at 94–95. 
 196  Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough, supra note 148, at 415. 
 197  See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
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considered feasible to change through persuasion only those behaviors with 
relatively few barriers.198 
A behavioral analysis of eco-labels as traditionally conceived—as a 
means to match eco-minded consumers to goods with environmental 
attributes—thus suggests that eco-label performance can be improved by 
designing labels to present information so as to avoid or account for 
cognitive errors or behavioral tendencies that distort consumers’ perception 
of a goods environmental attributes. The analysis also, however, surfaces an 
apparent upward limit in the market share of eco-labeled goods (defined by 
the number of individuals who assign sufficient value to environmental 
protection in their consumption choices) that traditionally has been 
understood to be capable of being overcome only or primarily through 
means exogenous to eco-label policy (such as the development of broader 
and deeper public environmental concern or a reduction in barriers to the 
purchase of eco-goods, such as reductions in cost or increasing availability 
of eco-labeled goods).199 As discussed below, however, behavioral insights 
also suggest possibilities for transforming eco-labels to significantly enhance 
their market share by increasing the perceived value of eco-labeled goods to 
consumers. 
B. Behavioral Insights for Next Generation Eco-labels 
Eco-labels could be reimagined as a means to build, expand, and define 
consumer preference for eco-labeled goods. That eco-labels do not presently 
function in this capacity may reflect the fact that over time eco-labels have 
increasingly become the product of government policy as opposed to private 
marketing efforts.200 One critique of eco-labels from a marketing perspective 
 
 198  Paul C. Stern, Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer Behavior, 22 J. 
CONSUMER POL’Y 461, 464–66 (1999) (“The chief implication for policy is that the extent to which 
behavior can be changed by interventions in the personal domain, such as education or 
information, depends on the strength of contextual forces: There are times and places when 
personal-domain interventions are likely to be effective and others when they will predictably 
fail.”); id. at 468 (“[E]ven information programs that are carefully designed to achieve these 
objectives produce only modest short-term behavioral changes. The most carefully crafted 
informational interventions have produced reductions of 10–20% in certain targeted consumer 
behaviors, such as littering, electricity consumption during peak-load periods, and electricity 
use for home cooling. The behaviors that change to produce these effects are almost always 
simple behaviors that can be changed with little inconvenience or expense—that is, behaviors 
for which external constraints are weak.”). See generally Davies et al., supra note 82, at 40 
(“[C]onsumers were willing to pay 28% more for a $10 item with ethical credentials [but only] 
15% more for a $100 item.”). 
 199  Hjelmar, supra note 138, 342–43 (describing convenience-shopping consumers as 
“pragmatic” and recommending that to encourage these pragmatic consumers to buy organic it 
will be necessary to decrease barriers such as price and availability). 
 200  In this paper, we do not address implementation of next generation labeling and thus 
leave for future consideration the propriety of government undertaking the approaches outlined 
herein. We note, however, the possibility that private entities or interest groups might 
spearhead these next generation approaches. We further note that many have noted that there 
are already many forces conditioning consumer sovereignty, often in an anti-environmental 
direction:  
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observes that the general marketing literature takes “the view that the 
company has an active role in shaping a market for its products” while the 
green marketing literature “assum[es] that there is an existing green 
consumer[:]”201 
[T]he past and current focal areas in green marketing have been the 
measurement of market size, identification of the green consumer and 
positioning through ecolabels. However, from the conventional marketing 
literature, other possible means of green marketing can be identified, including 
analyzing current and potential market needs and wants and addressing not 
only an existing green consumer segment but also a broader range of 
consumers.202 
Our review of behavioral research suggests three possibilities for deploying 
eco-labels to shape and expand the market for eco-labeled goods: 1) Eco-
labels could be purposefully designed and implemented to attract consumers 
motivated by social norms; 2) Eco-labels could appeal to a wider range of 
abstract norms, including abstract norms that are stronger and/or more 
broadly accepted or locally-salient; and 3) Eco-labels could highlight private, 
near and near-term benefits. 
1. Appealing to Social Norms 
One way to expand the market for eco-labeled goods is to expand their 
appeal to those who do not hold a personal norm of environmental 
protection, or at least for whom that norm is not sufficiently strong to 
motivate a green purchase, by tapping into the power of social norms in 
communities with strong environmental identity. One way to do this is to 
increase the visibility of eco-consumption. Both evolutionary psychology 
and norm theory suggest that individuals might find value (in the form of 
social esteem) in purchasing an eco-labeled good because of the social 
signal it sends. Indeed, in some contexts, invoking social norms may incent 
purchasing even where (or especially where) there are high barriers (high 
cost, high effort). Barriers might increase the social esteem value of 
purchasing a good because others are aware of the high cost or effort 
involved. Thus, the purchase of an expensive good can, through costly 
signaling and competitive altruism, suggest that the consumer is wealthy and 
 
[A]n entire supply chain of decisions and choices have occurred before the consumer 
reaches the store to choose from a predetermined range of options that have been 
procured and controlled by powerful corporate actors. In the midst of this contestation 
between consumer choice and corporate control, consumers are given the illusion of 
choice while both the supposed needs and desires underpinning these choices are 
constructed, and the choice set is strictly controlled, by marketing managers.  
Carrington et al., supra note 15, at 27.  
 201  Rex & Baumann, supra note 69, at 572. 
 202  Id. at 573. 
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thoughtful;203 through the lens of norm theory, it might also communicate 
that the person is a very committed environmentalist.204 
It might also be possible to use reverse visibility to invoke descriptive 
norms to encourage green purchases. Individuals tend to follow the crowd. 
Communicating that others are purchasing eco-goods can signal a 
descriptive norm and encourage others to likewise purchase eco-goods.205 
The concept of reverse visibility refers to the idea that there may be 
circumstances where the eco-consumption of others is unknown (invisible) 
but can be purposefully surfaced and publicized (made visible). Descriptive 
norms around eco-consumption could be communicated by a host of on- and 
off-label means. Labels or informational campaigns, for example, might 
advertise that the growth of organic foods exceeds that of conventional 
foods or offerings within stores might be physically presented to suggest 
that eco-goods are a common choice (by placing them first and at eye level, 
for example). 
2. Appealing to Alternate Abstract Norms 
Appealing solely to the abstract norm of environmental protection 
misses an opportunity to invoke more widely accepted or more fervently 
embraced alternative abstract norms and also creates the risk of triggering 
anti-environmental identities and backlash. The public benefits of eco-goods 
often serve values consistent with a host of abstract norms such as personal 
responsibility, the idea of not harming others, thrift, and the avoidance of 
waste. Reflexively presenting the myriad public benefits of eco-goods solely 
through the lens of environmental protection unduly constrains the segment 
of consumers to whom the information about those goods will appeal. This 
may be particularly important in the United States where environmental 
protection is politically charged and polarized. 
Decades of public appeals to increase environmental values and boost 
environmental actions have resulted in pro-environmental behaviors being 
paired with social groups, for example through imagery of green leaves, the 
planet, or the word organic. Unfortunately, anti-environmentalists may avoid 
these behaviors, even ones they would otherwise choose, when those 
actions carry an unwanted identity. “Thus, we advise caution in associating 
target behaviors with identities when designing environmental messages, 
product labels, or appeals to action.”206 
3. Highlighting Private, Near and Near-term Benefits 
Public environmental benefits are often shared widely and accrue 
distantly, in both a temporal and geographic sense. Principles of behavioral 
law and economics and evolutionary psychology both suggest that these 
 
 203  See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 204  See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text. 
 205  See supra notes 101–104, 167–169 and accompanying text. 
 206  Brick et al., supra note 163, at 235. 
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public environmental benefits are thus likely to be afforded low value in a 
consumer’s purchasing utility calculus.207 Behavioral law and economics has 
documented that individuals engage in hyperbolic discounting, tending to 
overvalue the present and greatly discount events in the distant future.208 
Evolutionary theories predict that humans should be concerned about 
environmental issues that are proximate in time and space and directly 
affect the individual.209 Moreover, general consumers (those without a strong 
personal environmental norm) might be uninterested in public 
environmental benefits.210 
It might, therefore, be beneficial to identify and exploit the private, 
near-term and geographically close benefits of eco-goods to enhance the 
value that they are afforded in a consumer’s purchasing calculus. The 
characterization of a product that uses less packaging might be reformulated 
from “save the earth” to “haul less garbage.” A product boasting low GHG 
emissions in production might be touted with a “save your seasons” 
exhortation. And to the extent that an eco-good offers a private benefit 
related to its public environmental benefits, that product attribute could be 
highlighted. For example, attributes of the reusable dish towel that could be 
emphasized might include the fact that it costs less over time than paper 
towels, results in the consumer having to haul less trash, and reduces 
kitchen clutter. 
We will close with a hypothesis and descriptive example. While we have 
lamented the low market share for most eco-goods, we have also noted the 
recent and notable growth of the organic food sector.211 Studies of organic 
consumers reveal that a substantial proportion choose organic food for its 
perceived health benefits212 and have little understanding of the actual 
meaning of the term organic as used in labeling.213 Notably, organic labels do 
not attest to the healthfulness of the food nor do studies appear to 
demonstrate that organic foods are, in fact, healthier.214 One way to 
understand the relative success of organic foods is that an affect heuristic 
 
 207  Others, exploring the gap between consumers’ ethical intentions and purchasing 
behaviors, posit that employing self-interest in purchasing decisions is a feature of market-
based exchange relations; i.e., that structural capitalism supports and promotes self-interested 
consumer decisions. Carrington et al., supra note 15, at 28. 
 208  See supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text. 
 209  See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
 210  See Hwang et al., supra note 69, at 11 (presenting the results of a study demonstrating for 
general consumers in Korea the private benefits of a product were more influential in 
purchasing than public environmental benefits). 
 211  See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 212  Many studies “have found health and nutritional concerns to be the most important 
factors influencing organic food purchase,” while others have shown that “health benefits are 
among the most important factors motivating the purchase of organic food.” Hjelmar, supra 
note 138, at 337, 341 (citation omitted). 
 213  Id. at 341 (“Research has shown that consumers generally do not understand the 
complexities of organic farming practices and food quality and consumers often feel uncertain 
and helpless.” (citations omitted)). 
 214  Id. (“Studies, however, have shown that there is no evidence that organic food is 
healthier or more nutritious than conventional food.”(citations omitted)).  
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(associating natural or organic with healthy) contributes to the common 
perception that organic foods offer consumers a significant private eco-
benefit (healthfulness) thereby prompting a larger share of consumers to 
purchase organic foods. Indeed, a well-known legal scholar speculates “that 
the immense popularity of organic foods owes a great deal to heuristic-
driven thinking, above all to the view that there is an association between 
the natural and the healthy, and between chemical and danger.”215 Viewed 
through a behavioral lens, then, one way to interpret the growth in the 
market for organic foods is as a manifestation of affect heuristic-driven 
belief in the (unproven) private benefits of organic food consumption. The 
growth of the market for organic foods may thus illustrate the potential 
power of behavioral insights to expand the market for eco-goods. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Evolutionary psychology offers insights into eco-labeling campaigns so 
as to increase their efficacy. We suggest that public exposure of the label (so 
that people see it) and the exposure of the purchasing behavior (so that 
other people can see that you have bought the product) are key elements to 
the success of eco-labels—the social context around product purchasing is 
as important as the eco-label itself. Thus, the success of eco-labeling is not 
just about the label itself. The social context around the product may be 
even more important, relying on deeply rooted psychological and behavioral 
propensities. 
We recommend that behavioral insights be used to improve eco-labeling 
as traditionally understood by incorporating knowledge about behavioral 
tendencies into label design so as to allow for more accurate matching of 
consumers’ preexisting environmental preferences to eco-labeled goods; and 
develop next-generation eco-labeling policy with the potential to 
significantly expand the market for eco-labeled goods by invoking social 
norms, broadening the normative bases to which eco-goods appeal, and 
emphasizing private, near and near-term benefits of eco-goods. 
What remains to be determined is the proper course for implementation 
(whether it is appropriate for the government to engage in more marketing-
like activity, whether and how to tailor labels to different consumer 
segments, the possibility of expanding beyond labels to 
promotional/information materials, the design of grocery stores, and the 
like), and how to design eco-labels to achieve other purposes, such as citizen 
education and to promote policy spillover.216 
 
 215  Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, supra note 130, at 768. 
 216  And there is the possibility that taking “environment” out of eco-goods promotion might 
jeopardize possibilities for positive policy spillover. See Trine Mørk et al., Determinants of 
Citizen Acceptance of Environmental Policy Regulating Consumption in Public Settings: 
Organic Food in Public Institutions, 148 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 407, 413 (2017) (explaining that 
“in attempts to enact change towards more sustainable consumption, market- and policy driven 
change may go hand in hand, as determinants of the one and support for the other are governed 
by the same mechanisms—at least in the case of organic food”). 
